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Post-Dictatorship Spain and Chile. 
 
 Aliza Sitrin, Bachelor of the Arts, 2019 
 
 
Thesis directed by: Professor Kiyoteru Tsutsui 
 
During the 20th century, Spain and Chile witnessed the rise of brutal dictatorships. Under the 
direction of dictators Francisco Franco and Augusto Pinochet, the Spanish and Chilean regimes 
engaged in human rights abuses to achieve their political, social, and economic goals. When the 
dictatorships ended, both countries transitioned into democracy. This thesis analyzes how the 
democratic transitions affected the extent of transitional justice achieved in post-dictatorship 
Spanish and Chilean society. This study argues that Chile attained a greater degree of transitional 
justice compared to Spain. Chile achieved increased transitional justice in post-dictatorship 
society because of its strong democratic legacy, the democratic and human rights friendly 
context of the region and time, the transition of governmental power to the left, and the 
establishment of a truth commission. In Spain and Chile, transitional justice was restricted by the 
need for negotiations between political ideologies, fear of instability, and amnesty laws. 
Transitional justice was increasingly limited in Spain because of the continuation of conservative 
governmental control, policies that suppressed transitional justice (the Pacto de olvido and 1977 
Amnesty Law), and greater fear from democratic uncertainty, military violence, and terrorism. 
This research gives historical context to the complicated natures of Spain’s and Chile’s 
democratic transitions and attempts at transitional justice. Examining the past enhances 
understanding of how Spain and Chile currently manage their histories of human rights abuses. 
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Chapter 1: Democratic Transitions and Transitional Justice 
I. Introduction:   
In the twentieth century, Spain and Chile witnessed the rise and fall of dictatorships that 
engaged in large-scale human rights violations to achieve their political, societal, and economic 
goals. Francisco Franco and Augusto Pinochet came to power through violent means and 
maintained their control by utilizing fear, violence, and tight top-down restrictions on the 
population. When the dictatorships ended in the late twentieth century, democracy rose in Spain 
and Chile. Each country managed their democratic transitions differently, resulting in varying 
degrees of transitional justice achieved. 
This thesis asks: how did the democratic transitions affect the extent of transitional 
justice achieved in post-dictatorship Spain and Chile? The study will analyze how historical 
contexts, types of democratic transitions and resulting power dynamics, fear, amnesty laws, and 
truth commissions affected the manifestation of transitional justice in Spain and Chile. I will 
contextualize the relevant political, social, cultural, and economic environments of the transitions 
to study why Spain and Chile underwent their democratic transitions as they did. The context and 
decisions made by each country affected the extent of transitional justice achieved throughout 
the transitional process. I argue that Chile achieved a higher degree of transitional justice 
compared to Spain. Chile obtained increased transitional justice because of its strong history with 
democracy, the democratic and human rights friendly context, the governmental transition of 
power to the left, and the establishment of a truth commission. In Spain and Chile, transitional 
justice was limited by the need to negotiate between the political sides, the fear of instability, and 
amnesty laws. In Spain, modernization laid the foundation for democracy and transitional justice, 
but transitional justice was heavily restricted by the continuation of conservative governmental 
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control and increased fear from democratic uncertainty, military violence, and terrorism. The 
Pacto de olvido (Pact of Forgetting) and 1977 Amnesty Law effectively prohibited political 
efforts to acknowledge crimes and recognize victims in Spain, which deeply constrained 
transitional justice.  
While Chile obtained a higher degree of transitional justice compared to Spain, neither 
country fully managed their history of human rights abuses in the immediate transitional and 
post-transitional phase. Modern day Spain and Chile are still dealing with the ramifications of 
the dictatorships. The dictatorships remain controversial, and efforts to achieve transitional 
justice vary per government administration and advocacy from victims, families of victims, the 
press, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
This thesis contributes to the understanding of current transitional justice in Spain and Chile by 
analyzing the extent of transitional justice achieved during the democratic transitions. 
Understanding the history of transitional justice in Spain and Chile is necessary to understand 
their present struggles with the past. I begin this chapter by discussing the concept of transitional 
justice. Next, I provide background information on the Spanish and Chilean dictatorships. After, 
I analyze the relevant literature on public shaming, rising interest in human rights, the 
relationship between transitional justice and stability, and critiques of transitional justice. Lastly, 
this chapter discusses the methodology used for this thesis.  
 
II. Transitional justice:  
 Transitional justice is concerned with the aftermath of conflicts and instances of human 
rights abuses. It has roots in philosophy, politics, and law (Eisikovits, 2014). The concept of 
transitional justice emerged in the 1990’s when American academics used the term to describe 
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the ways that governments approached problems related to human rights violations perpetrated 
by their predecessors (International Center for Transitional Justice [ICTJ], n.d.). The term stuck 
and transitional justice evolved into a practice that primarily attempts to recognize the dignity of 
individuals, redress and acknowledge violations, and prevent abuses from happening again 
(ICTJ, n.d.).  
According to the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), complementary 
goals of transitional justice include creating trustworthy and accountable institutions, ensuring 
access to justice for all, ensuring women and marginalized groups play a role in the creation of 
the new society, establishing respect for the rule of law, fostering a lasting resolution to the 
conflict, facilitating the peace process, establishing a foundation to address causes of the conflict 
and marginalization, and advancing reconciliation (ICTJ, n.d.). Common ways to attain 
transitional justice involve criminal prosecutions, truth-seeking, reparations, and political reform 
(ICTJ, n.d.). Efforts to attain transitional justice can occur during a conflict, during post-conflict 
transitions, during post-authoritarian transitions, and during the post-transitional period (Duthie 
& Seils, 2017). 
Transitional justice is difficult to achieve and efforts to obtain transitional justice vary per 
context. Understanding the context of a transitioning society is critical to recognizing the 
constraints that it faces. Factors such as distribution of power, polarization, instability, 
institutional weaknesses, fear, unsafety, and censorship among others must be taken into 
consideration when creating transitional justice approaches. Focusing on the needs, desires, and 
capabilities of a society is important when seeking to understand why a country approaches 
transitional justice as it does. Strategies for transitional justice are not uniform, but rather vary 
depending on societal context. Countries can tailor transitional justice to fit the needs and 
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limitations imposed by society. Transitional justice is often a slow process and requires careful 
planning. The history of Spain’s and Chile’s dictatorships influenced their approaches to 
transitional justice (IJTC, n,d).  
 
III. Background: 
a. Spain: 
 Francisco Franco was a fast-rising career soldier who joined the right-leaning rebel 
movement in Spain in the mid-1930’s due to the violent political and social unrest of the Second 
Republic, the democratic government of Spain between 1931 and 1939. Growing divisions 
between the left (Republicans) and the right (Nationalists) escalated, with the military supporting 
the right. Because of the divisiveness and instability of the era, Nationalists staged a coup to end 
Republican rule. Because Nationalists anticipated quick success, they named Franco the new 
head of government and commander in chief of the military. The Republicans prevented the 
coup, but the violence spiraled into a civil war (“Franco Biography,” 2016).  
 The Spanish Civil War between Republicans and Nationalists transpired between October 
1936 and April 1939. Reports on casualties from the war vary, but are estimated around 500,000 
deaths, with around 200,000 of those deaths resulting from executions by the Nationalists 
(“Franco Biography,” 2016). Known as “El Caudillo” (The Leader), Franco built the Spanish 
dictatorship and governed with fear, violence, and repression after winning the Civil War. The 
dictatorship imprisoned tens of thousands of Spaniards for their ideological opposition (“Franco 
Biography,” 2016). Networks of secret police inspired fear, censorship persisted, and unions 
were forbidden (“Franco Biography,” 2016). Franco prohibited regional languages and the 
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practice of religions other than Catholicism (Solsten & Meditz, 1988). Citizens lived with tight 
restrictions and widespread fear. 
Franco ruled Spain between 1939 and his death in 1975, but in the years following 1959 
the dictatorship witnessed loosening restrictions to accommodate economic development and 
growing dissent to government repression (Bernecker, 2007). This period politically, 
economically, and socially prepared the country for democracy (Bernecker, 2007). When Franco 
died, the ultra-conservative right lacked support from the Spanish population and the democratic 
transition ensued (Carias, 2017).   
 
b. Chile: 
 General Augusto Pinochet was also a fast-rising career soldier (Kandell, 2006). President 
Salvador Allende promoted Pinochet to the position of commander in chief of the military on 
August 23, 1973 because he believed that Pinochet was trustworthy and neutral (Kandell, 2006). 
President Allende faced intense civil and political divides as he sought to bring socialism to 
Chile. Societal chaos persisted due to poor economic performance, strikes, and protests (Kandell, 
2006). Pinochet was supposed to support President Allende in his efforts to maintain stability 
and quell unrest, however, the armed-forces led by Pinochet instigated a coup d’état against 
Allende on September 11, 1973. La Moneda (the presidential palace) was bombed and President 
Allende broadcasted a final speech praising good, hard-working Chileans, as well as denouncing 
fascism and the betrayal of the armed forces to Chile’s long history with democracy (Furuhashi, 
2006). Before committing suicide rather than surrender, President Allende expressed his faith in 
Chile’s ability to recover from this dark moment and rebuild a better society (Furuhashi, 2006).  
 	
6 
 After the successful coup d’état, Pinochet governed Chile through a four-person military 
junta dictatorship. Throughout the dictatorship, approximately 3,200 were killed or disappeared, 
and tens of thousands more were persecuted, imprisoned, tortured, and exiled based on their 
perceived threat to the dictatorship for their left-leaning opinions (Kandell, 2006). Across Chile, 
military personnel obtained positions in various towns, cities, and universities. The secret police 
and National Intelligence Directorate (DINA) created a culture of fear in Chile due to their 
excessive perpetration of human rights abuses (Truth Commission, 1990). Pinochet censored the 
press, prohibited strikes and protests, banned political parties and unions, dissolved Congress, 
and disregarded the Constitution (Kandell, 2006). In 1974, Pinochet named himself president and 
changed the role of the junta members to consultative positions (Kandell, 2006).  
In 1980, Pinochet's regime ratified a new constitution through a national referendum that 
institutionalized the new government. The document called for a national plebiscite in 1988 for 
citizens to vote on the political future of the country. Citizens would vote either YES or NO to 
the continuation of the military junta and Pinochet’s presidency for an additional eight years. The 
NO’s won the vote and Pinochet stepped down. The regime’s loss in the plebiscite prompted 
Chile’s democratic transition (International Commission, 1989).  
 
IV. Literature review: 
The democratic transitions affect modern day Spanish and Chilean society. While Chile 
and Spain utilized differing tactics to transition from dictatorship, neither country fully appeased 
their entire population because managing past human rights violations is a complicated, complex 
task. This paper is not a critique of the lack of transitional justice in these countries, but rather 
gives historical context to the complicated nature of the transitions. Countries should be held to 
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the highest of standards to continually encourage positive development, but commentary and 
critique without addressing historical complexities and the impossibility of instant transitional 
justice is nonsensical. The goal of this research paper is to analyze the relevant political, social, 
cultural, and economic contexts of Spain and Chile throughout the democratic transitions to 
understand how the countries acknowledged or did not acknowledged their history of human 
rights abuses. The paper is not arguing that transitional justice fully exists or does not exist, nor 
is it proposing solutions for better attempts to achieve justice in transitioning or transitioned 
societies. This paper serves the purpose of analyzing phenomena and their consequences to 
understand how actions affect the extent of transitional justice. Current literature critiques Spain 
and Chile, analyzes the international factors that influence transitional justice, examines the 
complexities between transitional justice and stability, and questions transitional justice; 
however, the scholarship does not fully address how the democratic transitions influenced the 
extent of transitional justice achieved in post-dictatorship Spain and Chile. 
 
a. Public shaming of Spain and Chile: 
Public shaming is a tool that NGOs, INGOs, and governments can use to influence the 
spread of human rights. When a country is shamed for poor adherence to human rights norms, it 
feels pressure to improve its human rights treatment to better its international standing. Margaret 
Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) argued that public shaming by human rights organizations is a 
central aspect of theoretical models to achieve human rights improvements because shaming 
develops transitional advocacy. Amanda Murdie and David Davis (2012) demonstrated that 
public shaming correlates with the betterment of human rights practices in the country that was 
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shamed. Public shaming is a powerful way to advance human rights in countries that do not 
adhere to international human rights standards.   
Prominent human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and the United 
Nations have critiqued Chile’s and Spain’s management of their history of human rights 
violations. The Deputy Director of Amnesty International has encouraged Chile to “come face-
to-face with its troubled past and finally send the message that the abuses of the Pinochet era will 
not be tolerated again” (Marengo, 2015). The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion of truth, justice, reparation, and guarantees of non-recurrence released a 2014 report 
on Spain to pressure the country to further acknowledge victims, create an official mechanism to 
address actions taken after the beginning of the Civil War, and reflect upon the abuses that 
transpired (“Proposal for Spain,” 2018). In 2013 and again in 2017, the Working Group on 
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances critiqued Spain’s lack of efforts to search for missing 
persons and exhume graves (“Proposal for Spain,” 2018). These organizations publicly published 
their opinion to pressure Chile and Spain to improve their human rights standards.  
While critiques are effective tools for human rights organizations to shame countries into 
correcting past human rights violations, this paper seeks to look beyond critiques and delve into 
the reasons why Spain and Chile approached transitional justice as they did. The political, social, 
cultural, and economic contexts of the era should be taken into consideration to understand 
current and past faults in transitional justice. This paper seeks to understand how transitional 
justice was influenced by Spain’s and Chile’s differing approaches to their democratic 
transitions. The purpose of this paper is not to argue that transitional justice has not been fully 
accomplished, but rather seeks to understand why the extent (or lack thereof) of transitional 
justice manifested as it did. This thesis will contribute to the understanding of transitional justice 
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and human rights policies, which will allow scholars to better understand why Spain and Chile 
have or have not addressed their history of human rights abuses.  
 
b. Rising interest in human rights:  
           Scholars have sought to understand why recognition of human rights and instances of 
their abuse have received amplified attention in recent decades. Ellen Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink 
(2000) argued that increased recognition of human rights in Latin America developed in the last 
two decades of the 20th century, which motivated many Latin American countries to address their 
history of human rights violations, as well as build legal frameworks to safeguard rights. They 
entitled this international phenomenon the “human rights norms cascade,” arguing that regional 
shifts in the importance of human rights have increased the desirability of human rights 
protections and related law compliance in Latin America (Lutz and Sikkink, 2000). These human 
rights trends fit with Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) coined term “norms cascade,” which refers 
to quick, extreme shifts in the legitimacy of norms and actions on behalf of those norms. Lutz 
and Sikkink accredit activists for drawing attention to human rights, but also claim that countries 
are motivated to address human rights because it projects an outward appearance of 
sophistication and development to the international community (Lutz and Sikkink, 2001).  
While international pressure and the desire to appear developed play a role in why some 
countries recognize their history of human rights abuses, countries may struggle to acknowledge 
their past with human rights violations based on the immediate needs and desires of their 
transitioning societies. Countries typically manage their history of human rights abuses based on 
domestic factors in addition to positive international appearance. This paper seeks to study how 
Spain’s and Chile’s approach to their democratic transitions influenced their acknowledgement 
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(or lack of acknowledgment) of human rights abuses. This thesis will analyze the foreign and 
domestic factors that influenced the way Spain and Chile transitioned, as well as examine how 
those factors affected the ability of society to attain transitional justice.  
 
c. Transitional justice versus stability: 
Justice in post-authoritarian and post-conflict countries is difficult to achieve. Gary Bass’ 
(2004) research on jus post bellum (justice after war) analyzed how it is morally important for 
countries to reconstruct stability and peace in societies that transition out of war or dictatorship. 
In post-dictatorship societies, the rise of new governments and their political beliefs determine 
the extent of governmental actions taken towards transitional justice. This study will analyze 
how the rise of new governments in Spain and Chile influenced the extent of transitional justice 
achieved in post-dictatorship society. Specifically, this thesis will analyze how the continuation 
of conservative rule in Spain versus the rise of leftist governance in Chile influenced 
governmental desires to achieve transitional justice. I argue that the transition to leftist rule in 
Chile augmented efforts to attain transitional justice. Balancing between transitional justice and 
stability is an important task for new governments. 
Scholars agree that immediate efforts to attain transitional justice may be undesirable in 
post-authoritarian or post-conflict countries. In her 2017 study examining the interconnectedness 
of truth, justice, and reparations in post-dictatorship Chile, Cath Collins concluded that “the 
loading of simultaneous truth, justice and reparations responsibilities and expectations onto any 
particular point of a post-authoritarian or post-conflict process may prove not only impractical 
but sometimes undesirable.” She argued that overloading unrealistic transitional justice efforts 
onto new, fragile, or resource-poor states may inhibit forward progress (Collins, 2017). Omar 
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Encarnación (2008) argued that the conflation of democracy and transitional justice is 
problematic because the processes of reconciliation and democratization are fundamentally 
different. He uses Spain’s democratic transition as evidence, citing that Spain chose to 
completely ignore its history of human rights abuses, yet the country still successfully 
transitioned to democracy (Encarnación, 2008). Collins (2017) and Encarnación (2008) 
recognized that post-dictatorship societies are not always capable of surviving large-scale 
transitional justice efforts due to the fraught, unstable political and social climate of many 
transitions. This study examines how the necessity of stability affects the extent of transitional 
justice achieved in post-dictatorship Spain and Chile. The decision of Spain and Chile to 
transition as they did is critical to the way transitional justice manifested.  
 
d. Critiques of transitional justice: 
Transitional justice has a variety of goals, which can be addressed through varying 
methods. Nir Eisikovits (2014) argued that the goals of transitional justice are politically 
important, but stated that they are often contradictory. He noted that criminal prosecutions can 
harm stability, conflict with the need to “cement” the rule of law, leave out important 
information that does not meet the evidence requirements, and focus on defendants rather than 
providing uninterrupted time for the victims to speak. He also discussed how the desire to purge 
former officials from the government may clash with the need to establish a functioning 
government. Criminalizing or ridding of former officials can result in a competence gap because 
experienced professionals are needed to build the new government (Eisikovits, 2014). 
Eisikovits made valid points about the complexities of transitional justice, but he did not 
discuss that transitional justice can be multifaceted. Approaches to transitional justice vary per 
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country, and countries cannot always completely mend the wounds of human rights abuses. The 
expectation for perfection is unrealistic because no approach to justice can completely resolve 
conflicts. Differing approaches to post-dictatorship justice have advantages and drawbacks, but 
carefully thought through attempts to achieve peace and justice should still be utilized. 
Transitions are complex, which suggests that approaches to transitional justice are also complex. 
This paper does not seek to examine the validity of Spain’s and Chile’s approaches to 
transitional justice, but rather seeks to understand how the democratic transitions affected the 
extent of transitional justice achieved.  
Makau Mutua (2015) examined the universality of transitional justice. He argued that the 
concept of transitional justice promotes a westernized notion of justice (Mutua, 2015). He 
believes that transitional justice is another tool utilized by the West to ascertain the dominance of 
westernized ideas of human rights, which value the acknowledgement of the past, retributive 
justice, the importance of the individual over the collective, and the superiority of civil and 
political rights compared to economic, social, and cultural rights (Mutua, 2015). Westernized 
notions of human rights may not be relevant across the globe, but transitional justice holds merit 
in the cases of Spain and Chile. Spain is a European country that is considered part of the 
“Western World,” thus westernized concepts of human rights and transitional justice are 
relevant. Chile is a Latin American country whose status as a “Western Country” is more 
complicated than its physical location in the Western Hemisphere, but transitional justice is 
relevant because Chile utilized principles of transitional justice throughout its transition. Chile 
acknowledged crimes, recognized victims, and sought to prevent human rights abuses from 
happening again by increasing civil and political rights for individuals. This study does not seek 
to prove or disprove the universality of transitional justice and Western notions of human rights, 
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but rather seeks to understand how the Spanish and Chilean democratic transitions influenced the 
extent of transitional justice achieved in post-dictatorship society. 
 
V. Methodology: 
 In this study, I analyze how the Spanish and Chilean democratic transitions influenced 
the extent of transitional justice achieved in post-dictatorship society. Analysis occurs through 
examinations of laws, public statements, reports, and polls from national governments, IGOs, 
NGOs, universities, academic journals and books, the press, and citizens. Information from these 
sources are evaluated to determine the relevant political, social, cultural, and economic contexts 
of the era. These contexts are then analyzed to understand why actors in Spain and Chile acted as 
they did throughout the democratic transition and rise of new governments, as well as how that 
affects the extent of transitional justice achieved.  
Qualitative data will be examined in this thesis because the influences and extent of 
transitional justice achieved are better measured through the study of social phenomena. Given 
the complex nature and variance present in transitional justice, a qualitative approach to 
understanding the extent of transitional justice will be used to accommodate for political, social, 
and economic nuance within each case study. Qualitative data will provide more details about 
how and why decisions and events occurred, as well as what their effects were. Primary and 
secondary sources will be examined.  
The practice of transitional justice outlined by the International Center for Transitional 
Justice will be utilized to measure transitional justice in Spain and Chile. This study will measure 
transitional justice according to the degree in which Spain and Chile attained the primary aims of 
transitional justice: recognize the dignity of individuals, redress and acknowledge violations, and 
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prevent abuses from happening again (ICTJ, n.d.). This paper will place significant focus upon 
recognizing victims and acknowledging crimes because preventing the recurrence of abuses in 
Spain and Chile came with institutionalizing democracy and basic rights. Complementary aims 
of transitional justice such as creating reliable institutions, ensuring access to justice, granting 
women and marginalized groups a role in the new democracy, developing respect for the rule of 
law, cultivating a permanent resolution to the conflict, aiding the peace process, addressing 
causes of the conflict and marginalization, and furthering reconciliation will also be utilized to 
measure transitional justice. 
 
VI. Conclusion: 
 In the following chapters I will analyze how the democratic transitions affected the extent 
of transitional justice achieved in post-dictatorship Spain and Chile. Chapter 2 will focus on 
Spain. It will provide an outline of the economic, social, and political changes in the Late-Franco 
dictatorship, which resulted in evolving morals, values, and attitudes towards human rights-based 
principles. This chapter will also discuss the politics surrounding the end of the Spanish 
dictatorship, the intricacies of the democratic transition, and the rise of Prime Minister Suárez’s 
new government. Chapter 3 serves as an analysis of events described in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 will 
discuss the moral foundation for transitional justice and democracy, as well as analyze how the 
nature of Spain’s transition and fear influenced the extent of transitional justice achieved. 
Chapter 4 will focus on Chile. This chapter will discuss the end of Pinochet’s regime, the 
constitutional reform process, and the rise of President Aylwin’s new government. Chapter 5 will 
analyze the events described in Chapter 4 by exploring how the significance of the regional and 
historical context, the nature of the democratic transition, the establishment of a truth 
 	
15 
commission, and the existence of amnesty laws contributed to the extent of transitional justice 
achieved in Chile. Chapter 5 will also compare the Spanish and Chilean cases to demonstrate 
how Chile attained increased transitional justice compared to Spain. Chapter 6 will summarize 
the variances in transitional justice achieved in Spain and Chile, as well as note the implications 
of the findings and discuss future points of interest. 
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Chapter 2: Understanding Spain 
I. Introduction: 
Beginning in 1959, Spanish governmental changes combined with pressure from citizens 
instigated policy shifts that built momentum for the democratic transition. Modernization altered 
the relationship between the dictatorship’s power and citizens’ freedoms. When Franco died in 
1975, the transformations from previous decades revealed a strong desire for democracy among a 
significant portion of the population. Leftist and rightists who were at odds for decades 
negotiated to restructure the government and create a new constitution. The left and right 
established policies of forgetting and amnesty through the Pacto de olvido and related 1977 
Amnesty Law. The dictatorship’s history of violence was ignored rather than confronted because 
the relationship between the right and the left was new and both sides wanted to prevent renewed 
violence. Spain successfully transitioned into a parliamentary monarchy, which has lasted 
through the modern day. This chapter will examine significant factors and events that structured 
Spain’s democratic transition to provide background information on how Spain’s democratic 
transition affected the extent of transitional justice achieved in post-dictatorship society. Firstly, 
this chapter will discuss modernization and reforms between 1959 and 1975. Secondly, the 
chapter will discuss the politics at play after Franco died. Thirdly, the chapter will examine the 
rise of the new democratic Spanish government and reforms.  
 
II. Changes during the Late-Franco dictatorship (1959-1975):  
Economic distress leading up to 1959 prompted leaders to instigate economic reforms, 
which correlated with changes in the social and political spheres of society. Economic, social, 
and political modifications loosened restrictions, increased freedoms, and reduced top-down 
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control. These changes opened Spanish society to liberal ideas for the first time since the Second 
Republic.  
Economic success began with the 1959 Stabilization Plan, which stressed liberalization 
and economic reform. New capitalist policies and structural adjustments contributed to economic 
growth, inflation control, elimination of the public deficit, rise in labor productivity, 
technological advancements, reduction of domestic market restrictions, and integration into the 
international economy. While the state still restricted political and social freedoms, these initial 
economic modifications permitted the country to take advantage of booming Western markets. 
Between 1959 and 1974, the country witnessed significant industrial growth, which transformed 
Spain from being a largely agrarian-based economy to a modernized, industrial economy (Aceña 
& Ruíz, 2007).  
Major factors in the “economic miracle” were foreign investment, emigration, and 
tourism (Aceña & Ruíz, 2007). The U.S. and successful Western European economies engaged 
in large-scale foreign investment in Spain, which provided resources and technology for growth. 
Because over 1.5 million Spaniards emigrated abroad between 1960 and 1972, domestic 
unemployment was reduced, workers obtained increased bargaining power, and remittances sent 
from family members outside of Spain covered 50% of the foreign debt (Santos, 1999). The rise 
of tourism provided the country with increased revenue from visitors, as well as served as a 
direct source for foreign and domestic investment.  
The “economic miracle” contributed to changing living standards. Poverty and inequality 
shrank compared to previous decades, however, wealth disparities across regions within Spain 
persisted (Aceña & Ruíz, 2007). Economic success and industrial development contributed to 
urbanization as Spaniards left the countryside for cities searching for better opportunities and 
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jobs outside of agriculture (Aceña & Ruíz, 2007). Between 1960 and 1978, the rural population 
went from 4.8 million to 2.4 million (Palomares, 2007).  
The economic value of tourism increased the desire of the Spanish state to portray the 
country as modernized to the international community. The desire to portray a modernized image 
of Spain increased the promotion of liberal and pluralistic values compared to the 
conservativeness of previous decades (Pack, 2007). Citizens developed new attitudes regarding 
social relations, gender roles, leisure, consumerism, efficiency, tolerance, religion, subversion to 
the state, family, Europe, and morality (Bernecker, 2007; Pack, 2007). Internal migration and 
foreign tourists diffused democratic values, while the emigration of Spanish workers to Western 
European countries also exposed Spaniards to democracy and anti-Franco sentiments 
(Bernecker, 2007). Tourism within Spain also permitted interaction between Spaniards and 
foreigners who brought varying international perspectives (Pack, 2007). While conservatives 
such as technocrats and clergyman resented these changes for their decadence and shift from old 
ways, the country continually moved in this modernized direction (Pack, 2007).  
Increased freedoms of expression and decreased censorship were major developments 
that contributed to the growth of modernized values and attitudes. While state repression and 
restrictions were still in effect, the government decreased complete top-down control and 
violence in accordance with the development of ideals on tolerance. The increased accessibility 
of telephones, movies, radios, televisions, and the media to larger sectors of the population 
furthered the spread of varying opinions, including those that did not align with the dictatorship 
(Sánchez, 2007). The 1966 Press Law, while still maintaining censorship policies, permitted 
increased public discussion of politics (Palomares, 2007). This law allowed a greater dispersion 
of domestic and foreign opinions, particularly thoughts on democracy.   
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Economic development and changing aspirations resulted in larger percentages of the 
population receiving secondary education and university degrees. The literacy rate dropped from 
19% in 1940 to 9% by 1970 as increased educational opportunities were sought by Spaniards to 
raise social status, obtain greater professional opportunities, and improve material conditions. 
Education increased the number of Spaniards learning about global opinions and perspectives 
(Bernecker, 2007).  
The dictatorship prohibited political parties and entities, but political ideas were still 
discussed. New political perspectives were disseminated through private gatherings, clubs, 
seminars, research centers, publications, and economic and cultural associations. Nonconformists 
who began questioning the dictatorship could be divided into “aperturistas” and “reformistas.” 
“Aperturistas” desired the slow opening of the government from the inside out, while 
“reformistas” wanted to completely replace the Franco regime with a new democratic 
government. These nonconformists played a critical role in the future democratic transition by 
providing open spaces to discuss politics, normalizing public debate, and effectively channeling 
demands for change. Their efforts helped ensure democracy upon Franco’s death (Palomares, 
2007). 
Increased freedoms, education, and political awareness prompted citizens to seek 
increased political representation to solve their problems. Because Spaniards advocated for a 
greater economic and political voice, the Spanish state permitted increased citizen engagement 
through the 1964 Law of Associations. This concession decreased protests and reduced 
dissatisfaction. The law allowed the creation of voluntary organizations that utilized democratic 
principles. Though the dictatorship carefully monitored the associations, the latter stressed 
tolerance, negotiation, fair representation, and lobbying. The associations created a civil society 
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that valued participation and pluralism. This “pre-democratic civil society” contributed to a 
liberal political culture over authoritarianism. Increased exposure to democratic principles laid a 
foundation for the future democracy (Radcliff, 2007).  
A critical aspect of the dictatorship’s claim to legitimacy was its connection to the 
Catholic Church. Catholicism was the official religion of Spain under the dictatorship, with an 
overwhelmingly large portion of the population identifying as Catholic despite variances in the 
degree of practice (Solsten & Meditz, 1988). The validity of the Spanish dictatorship was 
questioned after the Second Vatican Council of 1962-1965, which modified the Church’s 
teachings to meet the standards and desires of the modern world (Callahan, 2007). The Vatican 
began to stress human rights, religious freedom, and equality (Callahan, 2007). The Vatican’s 
changes instigated a debate within the Spanish Catholic Church between conservatives who were 
wary of reforms and liberals who encouraged democracy and change. Significant pressure from 
the lower-ranking clergymen ultimately pushed the Spanish Catholic Church in favor of the 
Vatican’s reforms (Callahan, 2007). This decision symbolized a break between the dictatorship 
and the Spanish Church, which was particularly significant because the Spanish Church was 
traditionally a conservative segment of society that had backed the dictatorship for decades 
(Callahan, 2007). While the Spanish Church began to stress the need for political change, it 
desired changes from inside the regime and maintained a general wariness of the left (Callahan, 
2007).  
 
III. Politics surrounding the end of the Spanish dictatorship: 
 Loosening governmental control and changing attitudes prior to 1975 laid the 
groundwork for a democratic Spain. Decades of modernization resulted in the desire for 
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democracy among a significant percentage of the population. After Franco’s death in 1975, the 
country had to mitigate between leftists who desired democracy and rightists who favored the 
continuation of the dictatorship. Before his death, Franco tried to ensure the longevity of the 
dictatorship by selecting successors. 
 In 1947 the passage of the Law of Succession in the Leadership of the State effectively 
reinstituted the monarchy, as well as granted Franco the positions of Regent for Life and Head of 
State. The law also gave Franco the right to select his successor (Owens, 1947). In 1969, Franco 
selected Juan Carlos of Bourbon, to serve as his Head of State successor, signifying that Juan 
Carlos would become king upon Franco’s death or retirement (Giniger, 1972). Juan Carlos was 
the grandson of Alfonso XIII, the last Spanish king before the abolition of the monarchy during 
the establishment of the democratic Second Republic. In June 1973, due to old age, Franco 
sought to lessen his political responsibilities (Carias, 2017). While he remained Head of State, he 
chose Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco to become Prime Minister (“Franco Biography,” 2016). On 
December 20, 1973, after only holding power for half a year, Carrero Blanco was assassinated by 
the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), a leftist Basque separatist organization that utilized terrorist 
tactics to fight for regional independence. In order to fill Carrero Blanco’s newly vacated 
position, Franco selected Carlos Arias Navarro to become the new prime minister. Arias Navarro 
was previously the Minister of Governance and a Franco supporter. Upon Franco’s death on 
November 20, 1975, Juan Carlos was installed as king to fill the position of Head of State, and 
after 36 years of Franco’s rule, the country moved into the hands of Prime Minister Arias 
Navarro and King Juan Carlos.  
Arias Navarro and the ultra-conservative right favored the continuation of authoritarian 
rule, while the King and a large portion of the populace and leftist press advocated for 
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democratic reforms. Arias Navarro was unlikely to instigate democratic reforms such as free 
elections and the legalization of political parties (Preston, 2004). The leftist media repeatedly 
critiqued Arias Navarro and his desire to continue Francoist policies, while the rightist media 
defended Franco’s legacy and those who sought to continue and protect it (Carias, 2017). 
Cambio 16, a leftist Spanish news magazine, coined the popular term “bunker” to refer to the 
powerful, ultra-conservative politicians who sought to uphold Franco’s governmental structure. 
Cambio 16 perceived this “bunker” to be the last defense against democracy, and the magazine 
called for democratic reforms to dismantle the “bunker” (Carias, 2017). Members of the 
“bunker” needed to be overruled to create a democratic Spain, but these elites sought to maintain 
their political status and policies. Spaniards were increasingly impatient with the “bunker,” but 
the residual power of Franco’s officials made the path to democracy unclear.  
King Juan Carlos recognized the rising desire for reforms among a significant portion of 
the population and knew that the continuation of the monarchy would require distancing himself 
from the Franco regime (Eder, 1970). The King discussed his concerns with Newsweek upon 
visiting the United States in 1976. The paper reported, “Spain’s new ruler is gravely concerned 
about right-wing resistance to political change. The time for reform has come, he believes, but 
Prime Minister Carlos Arias Navarro, a holdover from Franco’s days, has demonstrated more 
immobility than mobility. In the King’s opinion, Arias is an unmitigated disaster, for he has 
become the standard-bearer of that powerful band of Franco loyalists known as ‘the bunker’” 
(Carias, 2017). Even though Franco selected both King Juan Carlos and Arias Navarro to serve 
as his successors, the King openly critiqued Arias Navarro and the conservative right. King Juan 
Carlos advocated for democratic changes over the continuation of Francoist restrictions. He 
desired forward “mobility,” and believed that political reforms would be necessary in the new 
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post-Franco society. The King steered Spain towards democracy by supporting the left over the 
right. The powerful position from which he championed his perspectives on political change 
gave greater voices to individuals that critiqued Franco officials. Arias Navarro resigned on July 
1, 1976 in response to rising domestic pressure from the King and leftists who continually 
criticized the lack of representation, reforms, and freedoms (Carias, 2017). 
 
IV. Spain’s democratic transition and reforms:  
The Law of Succession in the Leadership of the State granted the King the power to 
choose the new prime minister after Arias Navarro’s resignation. King Juan Carlos selected 
Adolfo Suárez to occupy the position. During Franco’s dictatorship, Suárez held various high-
ranking positions, including the Vice Secretary General of the Movimiento Nacional, a 
Francoist institution that backed the regime. Because Suárez achieved political importance 
through his support of Franco, opposition members questioned the King’s decision to grant 
Suárez the premiership (Carias, 2017).  
Despite his past, Adolfo Suárez proved to be dedicated to democratic reforms. He 
played an active role in the passage of landmark legislation that ensured the feasibility of 
democracy. After ascending to office, Prime Minister Suárez reformed the Penal Code, which 
began the process of legalizing political parties, beginning with the Socialist Party (PSOE) 
(Casanova & Gil Andrés, 2014). He passed amnesty decrees for political prisoners and 
individuals that were considered dangerous under the dictatorship for their political ideals 
(Carias, 2017). In 1977, because of negotiations and concessions between Suárez and the 
Communist Party (PCE), the government legalized the long-oppressed PCE (Carias, 2017). 
This action signified the freedom of all political perspectives, including those that Franco 
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previously persecuted. Despite past violence and high tensions, these democratic reforms born 
out of inter-party negotiation built a foundation for future compromise and stability. The 
changes served as a vital first step towards reconciliation between Suárez and the political left.  
The Pacto de olvido augmented the ability of the left and the right to coexist in the 
political sphere. The Pacto de olvido was an informal agreement between politicians on the 
left and right that altered the discussion of the Civil War and the dictatorship. The basic goal 
of the pact was to forget or “move-on” from the violence that transpired between the 
beginning of the Civil War and Franco’s death (Aguilar, 2012; Encarnación, 2014). Both sides 
of the political spectrum agreed to the pact to satiate the fear of instability. Neither the 
political left nor the right desired renewed violence. Both sides wanted to avoid the 
persecution or prosecution of those who shared their political ideals, and the Pacto de olvido 
prevented either side from condemning the other (Encarnación, 2014). Because of its informal 
nature, the Pacto de olvido did not originally have a legal basis, but it permitted leftists and 
rightists to set aside fear and negotiate during the early transitional phase. While extremist 
members from the left and the right preferred domination of their political opinions over 
negotiation and cooperation, moderates agreed that forgetting was essential to build a 
democracy given the split nature of the country.  
The Law of Political Reform, which was passed in a national referendum, effectively 
guaranteed democracy through the promise of future free elections. Soon after, on June 15, 
1977, Spain held its first election since the governance of the Second Republic. The full 
Cortes Generales, comprised by the Congress of Deputies and the Senate, needed to be elected 
to form a complete parliament. Over 6,000 candidates sought election and 156 political parties 
participated. Because of the multi-party system, many parties formed national and regional 
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coalitions and alliances. Suárez’s party, the Union of the Democratic Center (UCD), was the 
main winner of the election with 165 seats in the Congress of Deputies and 105 seats in the 
Senate. Suárez remained prime minister, but the party was just short of obtaining an absolute 
majority in the Cortes Generales (Spain Date of Elections, 1977). 
Soon after the election, the Pacto de olvido was given legal basis through the 1977 
Amnesty Law. Rather than seek truth and justice, the Amnesty Law continued the Pacto de 
olvido’s emphasis on “desmemoria” (disremembering), which was designed to avoid all 
discussion of subjects that caused memory of the Civil War and dictatorship (Encarnación, 
2014). From the perspective of the right, the law circumnavigated prosecutions and 
accountability for the crimes they committed under Franco, including murder, kidnapping, 
forced exile, and torture (Encarnación, 2014). On the left, the law released leftist perpetrators 
of violence from responsibility for their crimes, but also permitted liberals to become equal 
members of society (Aguilar, 2012). Leftists could publicly voice their opinions, return from 
exile, and obtain freedom from jail, which included receiving pensions for their time spent in 
jail and the expungement of their criminal records (Aguilar, 2012).  
The Pacto de olvido and 1977 Amnesty Law aimed to transition the country into 
democracy through cooperation rather than renewed violence. Preventing renewed violence was 
the priority of many Spanish citizens due to the deadly consequences of the Civil War and 
resulting dictatorship (Aguilar, 2012). Spaniards anticipated a strenuous transition and did not 
want to jeopardize democratic success (Humlebæk, 2007). Mitigating tensions between the left 
and the right was necessary because while increased numbers of the population wanted 
democracy, the path to democracy was uncertain and complex. The law inhibited the creation of 
a truth commission, prohibited the observation of anniversaries of events that occurred during the 
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Civil War and dictatorship, and prevented the government from granting significant recognition 
to victims and their families. The government was also unable to partake in the exhumation of 
mass graves (Encarnación, 2014). A vast majority of the Cortes Generales passed the Amnesty 
Law, with 296 votes in favor, 18 abstentions (all by members of the far-right), 2 votes opposed, 
and 1 invalid vote (Aguilar, 2012). Politicians from both the left and the right believed this was 
the best way for Spain to move forward.  
In order to officially establish the democratic nature of the state, a new constitution was 
needed to outline the rights and responsibilities of citizens and the government. After 
negotiation between leftist and rightist parties in the Congress of Deputies and the Senate, the 
Cortes Generales passed a new constitution on October 31, 1978. The Constitution was 
subsequently ratified through a national referendum on December 7, 1978, and then formally 
sanctioned by the King on December 27, 1978. The Constitution granted universal suffrage to 
Spaniards over 18 years of age, as well as stressed the principal of equality for all (Spanish 
Constitution, 1978). Citizens were granted civil, political, and socio-economic rights, including 
freedom from unwarranted search and seizure and the right to a fair trial. Political parties and 
trade unions were permitted as long as they abided by democratic procedures (Spanish 
Constitution, 1978). Citizens were granted the right to work, strike, and receive pensions if they 
were elderly, disabled, or unable to take care of their families (Spanish Constitution, 1978). 
The army was charged with protecting the independence and sovereignty of Spain, but the 
Constitution specified that the government held ultimate responsibility for Spain’s protection to 
prevent the army from obtaining too much power (Solsten & Meditz, 1988). 
Regional autonomy has continuously been a contentious topic in Spain, and 
politicians hotly debated the subject throughout the constitutional drafting process. Leftists in 
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regions like Basque Country and Catalonia held desires ranging between wanting increased 
regional autonomy to aspiring for complete independence from Spain. Rightists desired the 
continuation of Franco’s policies of Spanish national unity, homogeneity, and centralism. 
Ultimately, the new constitution stressed national unity to demonstrate the unitary nature of 
the country, but also granted significant self-governing powers to regions like Basque 
Country and Catalonia. Culturally, these areas were also permitted to speak their own 
language and use their own flags, which was previously prohibited under Franco. The final 
constitutional decision was designed to balance the desires of the right and the left, but the 
far-right and the regional separatists remained unsatisfied because both groups preferred a 
more extreme decision in their favor (Solsten & Meditz, 1988).  
The dissatisfied ETA continued using violent tactics to fight for Basque 
independence. They utilized bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings to fight for their 
goals. The organization was deemed a terrorist organization and their victims included 
civilians, government officials, and military personnel. ETA terrorism began prior to the end 
of the dictatorship, but violence increased dramatically during the transitional years. Between 
1976 and 1980, 267 people were killed and thousands more were injured or living under 
threat of attack. Spaniards feared the unpredictability of extremist groups and the threat that 
they produced (Ceberio Belaza, 2018).  
A failed coup d’état in 1981 demonstrated the unpredictability of Spain’s transition. The 
coup d’état, known as El Tejerazo, was instigated on February 23, 1981 by Lieutenant General 
Antonio Tejero Molina, who led 200 armed officers of the Civil Guard into the Congress of 
Deputies during a vote deciding on the next prime minister. The coup d’état stemmed from 
resistance to the new democratic order and frustration over ETA violence and demands 
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(McLean, 2006). Those in the room were held hostage for 18 hours, but Tejero and his forces 
ultimately surrendered without killing anyone. Tejero expected support from the rest of the 
military, but the armed forces did not come to his aid (Koven, 1981). The King received 
significant credit for restoring order because he personally called all nine of the country’s major 
regional military commanders to persuade them not to join the coup (Koven, 1981). The King 
also participated in a televised national appeal for the country to maintain constitutional order 
(Koven, 1981). The coup d’état was largely and publicly condemned by members of the Cortes 
Generales and the press who perceived the attempted coup as a shameful stain on the new 
Spanish democracy (Koven, 1981). In the aftermath of the attempted coup, Spaniards were 
uncertain about the stability of their new democracy.  
 
V. Conclusion:  
 This chapter outlined relevant background information regarding Spain’s democratic 
transition to provide context for the following chapter’s analysis of how Spain’s democratic 
transition affected the extent of transitional justice achieved in post-dictatorship society. 
Spain’s transition to democracy was shaped by economic, social, and political changes that 
began in the fifteen years prior to the end of the dictatorship. Through industrialization and 
modernization, the country adopted ideals that increased the desirability of democracy. 
Franco’s death marked a turning point in the dictatorship’s longevity, and the resignation of 
Arias Navarro and the rise of Adolfo Suárez demonstrated the desire for democratic reforms. 
The Pacto de olvido and subsequent 1977 Amnesty Law established political coexistence and 
permitted the left and right to negotiate throughout the democratic transition and constitutional 
drafting process. Democratization was complicated by fear of terrorism and renewed violence. 
 	
29 
Spain’s democratic transition suppressed transitional justice because the country chose to 
ignore their history of human rights abuses rather than confront their past.  
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Chapter 3: Transitional Justice in Spain 
I. Introduction:  
Transitional justice was not a priority during the democratic transition in Spain due to the 
political and societal context of the transition. Spain’s democratic transition produced a limited 
degree of transitional justice because primary aims of transitional justice, such as acknowledging 
crimes and recognizing victims, were actively suppressed. Transitional justice was restricted to 
governmental reforms that built democratic institutional strength. While modernization and the 
establishment of democracy fostered the foundation for transitional justice, the need for 
negotiations combined with wide-spread fear prevented the manifestation of primary aims of 
transitional justice. The political right held greater authority than the left throughout the 
transition process, but both sides negotiated and made concessions. The right used their power to 
avoid responsibility for human rights violations and inhibit transitional justice. The fear of 
instability prompted policies of forgetting and amnesty rather than risk renewed fighting. The 
primary aims of transitional justice were impeded because society prioritized safety and security. 
This chapter will analyze how the aspects of Spain’s democratic transition discussed in the 
previous chapter affected the extent of transitional justice achieved in post-dictatorship society. 
First, this chapter will examine how the foundation for democracy established before 1975 
opened the door for transitional justice. Second, this chapter will study how power dynamics 
throughout the democratic transition limited the feasibility of transitional justice. Third, this 
chapter will analyze how fear of instability motivated the country to seek stability over 
transitional justice.  
 
II. Foundation for democracy and transitional justice in pre-1975 Spain: 
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 Modernization is conducive to democracy. As Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel 
(2009) argued, economic development brings predictable changes to society, culture, and 
politics. Their evidence suggests that postindustrial societies develop cultural changes that 
emphasize individual autonomy and self-expression values over bureaucratization and 
centralization. These altering values bring a growing desire for emancipation from authority. 
Free choice, freedom of expression, political involvement and activism, and growing tolerance 
are increasingly desired. Rising education rates are central to this trend because independent 
thinking makes people better equipped and more likely to voice opinions on politics. These 
individuals are increasingly likely to question hierarchical authority. While modernization does 
not guarantee democracy, the changing values that accompany modernization increase the 
probability of democracy in a society (Inglehart &Welzel, 2009).  
Inglehart’s and Welzel’s theory on modernization is highly applicable to the changes seen 
in Spain between 1959 and 1975. Economic development and the rise of a postindustrial society 
brought changing social and political mentalities, which shifted the tolerance that Spaniards had 
for lack of freedoms and human rights. Leftists began advocating for democracy. The 
increasingly educated Spanish population was less inclined to accept the ways of the old 
dictatorship. In universities, students were exposed to philosophy, sociology, and new ideologies 
like Marxism (Bernecker, 2007). Learning about principles such as equality, human nature, 
human rights, and free will increased intolerance for the dictatorship among the student 
population (Bernecker, 2007). Violence previously perpetrated by the regime faced growing 
intolerance. Advocacy for a better way of life soared, and students joined ranks with other 
intellectuals, workers, and members of society that disagreed with the dictatorship to form 
opposition movements (Bernecker, 2007). These groups fought for civil liberties despite the 
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threat of exile and prison (Bernecker, 2007). Opposition trends were magnified and dispersed 
through growing media outlets and willingness to critique the regime, which demonstrated 
disdain for violence and human rights abuses (Palomares, 2007). 
Liberalizing notions of politics and governance fostered a greater expectation and desire 
for democracy among a large percentage of the population upon Franco’s death. According to 
the International Center for Transitional Justice, a goal of transitional justice is to reform laws 
and institutions, including the judiciary and military, to establish accountability and trust (ICTJ, 
n.d.). Pre-1975 advocates ensured that these democratic goals were clear and enacted upon in the 
form of governmental and institutional reforms once the transition began. While Spain’s 
transition to democracy valued economic and political stability over transitional justice, the shift 
to democracy represented the growing liberal population’s desire and successful ability to 
advocate for an end to the aspects of the dictatorship that would later inspire the need for 
transitional justice. While ultra-conservatives wanted to retain authoritarian structure, moderate 
conservatives recognized the need to adopt democratic reforms to appease the liberal population.  
While actual efforts to attain key elements of transitional justice were not made during 
the democratic transition, the moral basis for transitional justice was rooted in the large-scale 
mindset changes among the growing liberal population during the 1960’s and 1970’s. While 
Spaniards still lived under dictatorship, this period represented a shift towards the desire for 
human rights. Transitional justice requires the end of the source of violence and repression, and 
this period marked growing dissatisfaction with negative government actions, as well as the 
desire for better governance and more freedoms. Greater knowledge and dispersal of opposition 
ideas and democratic values about representation, equality, and freedoms contributed to the 
foundation of transitional justice because a wider-range of anti-dictatorship perspectives were 
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spread among the population (Palomares, 2007). While the acknowledgment of crimes and 
recognition of victims were not present during Spain’s democratic transition because of fear and 
the need for stability, this theoretical foundation existed for supporters of transitional justice to 
expand upon in the mid-2000’s when the desire for transitional justice was increasingly popular 
and feasible. In the 2000’s, rising numbers of Spaniards felt politically and economically secure 
enough to advocate for transitional justice. Spain’s strong democratic system of governance 
permitted them to safely and securely voice their opinions. The path to democracy was 
developed through economic, social, and political reforms between 1959 and 1975; built between 
1975 and 1978; and consolidated and stabilized through the 2000’s. 
The Spanish dictatorship was losing legitimacy to rising desires for democratic reforms, 
and changes adopted by the Spanish Catholic Church after the Second Vatican Council of 1962-
1965 further decreased the dictatorship’s validity. High-ranking members of the Spanish 
Church’s hierarchy had supported the repressive dictatorship for decades, which alienated the 
Spanish public from the Church (Bernecker, 2007). The Church’s lack of respect for human 
rights and the resulting alienation increased secularization in Spanish society, which was placing 
a higher value on freedoms and rights (Bernecker, 2007). Even though secularization decreased 
the number of fully practicing Catholics, Catholicism remained a popular religion in Spain with 
82% of Spaniards still identifying with Catholicism by 1980. While these individuals considered 
themselves Catholics, they identified with the religion to varying levels of practice and 
commitment (Solsten & Meditz, 1988). Because of the Vatican’s value to Catholic Spaniards, the 
Second Vatican Council’s promotion of democracy and human rights resulted in social 
ramifications in Spanish society (Callahan, 2007). Pressure from progressive and reformist 
lower-ranking clergymen pushed the small, high-ranking Spanish Church elite who traditionally 
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backed the dictatorship to adopt the Second Vatican Council’s reforms. This religious 
modification publicly cost the dictatorship a major source of its legitimacy to concepts that better 
aligned with democracy and transitional justice (Callahan, 2007).  
The Second Vatican Council stripped the dictatorship of the legitimacy it claimed 
through its connection with Catholicism. Loss of legitimacy is detrimental to a regime’s 
longevity because governments need legitimacy to maintain their power over citizens 
(Mainwaring, 1989). The Spanish dictatorship faced weakening authority after the Spanish 
Catholic Church adopted the Second Vatican Council’s liberal reforms. While many Catholic 
Spaniards already shared the opinions of the lower-ranking clergymen who swayed the Spanish 
Church’s decision to change, the value of human rights, religious freedom, and equality 
increased among the population (Callahan, 2007). This change made the Spanish Church a 
player in the path to democracy, and continued the process of laying the groundwork for future 
transitional justice by demonstrating growing intolerance for violence and repression. 
 
III. Nature of the democratic transition in Spain:  
 Franco’s death served as a catalyst for democratic change in Spain. The expectation and 
desire for democracy grew during previous decades, and Franco’s death provided Spain with an 
opportunity to transition from dictatorship to democracy. Critiques of Arias Navarro and the 
ultra-conservative right demonstrated that many Spaniards no longer wanted to live under 
dictatorship, but rather desired democratic reforms and freedoms. King Juan Carlos and Prime 
Minister Adolfo Suárez were advocates of reform and sought to remake the governmental 
structure.  
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 The end of dictatorships and resulting power dynamics shape the way a country can 
transition into democracy. Scott Mainwaring (1989) argued that dictatorships can transition into 
democracy through a major defeat of the regime followed by the establishment of a new 
democratic government by the winners; through the breakdown of the regime due to internal 
schisms or delegitimization; or through internal steps taken by the dictatorship to liberalize 
aspects of the government and obtain democracy. This final form of transition is known as a 
transition through transaction, and it involves members of the regime remaining important actors 
throughout the transition. A transition through transaction can include participation by the 
opposition. Mainwaring also discusses transitions through extrication as a middle ground. A 
transition through extrication is when an authoritarian government is weakened, but not fully 
defeated. Former authorities can negotiate throughout the democratic transition, but not from a 
position of great strength (Mainwaring, 1989).  
The Spanish dictatorship was never defeated, but rather the dictatorship ended when 
Franco died and democratic reforms were adopted. The democratic transition in Spain fits best 
into the transition through transaction category of Mainwaring’s (1989) model because former 
Franco authorities guided the transition. Suárez and the political right led the democratic 
reformation process between the death of Franco in 1975 and the 1977 election, as well as after 
the 1977 election until the 1982 elections in which the PSOE obtained power. The right and left 
both made concessions throughout the reformation process, but the right came from a position of 
power since they held more seats in the Cortes Generales while the left came from a weaker 
position due to its recent history with oppression and lack of parliamentary majority. While 
neither side had a complete majority in the Cortes Generales, the right held more seats and 
occupied the premiership.  
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The left, including the PSOE and PCE, entered negotiations with Prime Minister Suárez 
and the right. Concessions by the right involved loosening control and restrictions, while the left 
conceded opinions and desired reforms to obtain acceptance into the new democratic fold. The 
right permitted the existence of opposition parties, releases from jails, return from exile, and 
increased regional autonomy in exchange for leftist recognition and support for the new 
constitutional monarchy (Carias, 2017). While the right needed to bargain due to decreased 
legitimacy following the end of the dictatorship, the right maintained more bargaining power as 
they came from a position of political authority.  
The long oppressed PCE, which was considered an “enemy of the state” under Franco, 
was not accepted into society until 1977. Santiago Carillo, the leader of the PCE, and Suárez 
entered secret negotiations in which Carillo accepted the monarchy in exchange for the legality 
of the PCE and the promise that the monarch would have limited powers in the new government 
(Carias, 2017). While many on the right argued against the legalization of the Communist Party 
and many communists opposed recognizing the legitimacy of the monarchy, Carillo accepted the 
terms. It was the only way to obtain full political freedoms for the PCE. The communists were 
negotiating to reobtain their place in society. The right was negotiating because Suárez believed 
that the legalization of all perspectives, even those that were previously harshly repressed, was 
necessary to legitimize the new democracy (Carias, 2017). The dominant power relationship of 
the right is evident because the communists were negotiating for basic freedoms and the right 
was negotiating to establish a positive perception of the new democracy. The right never needed 
to negotiate for basic freedoms for their partisans as they quickly attained those rights after the 
democratic transition. Leftists often had to make concessions to obtain acceptance into society 
and were therefore increasingly likely to make larger concessions during political negotiations. 
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Rightists were able to focus on other goals during the transition, such as avoiding prosecution for 
their human rights abuses.  
The transition through transaction nature of the democratic transition was evident in the 
Pacto de olvido and 1977 Amnesty Law. Both sides agreed to “forget” the past and eliminate all 
discussion of the Civil War and dictatorship (Encarnación, 2008). For the right, forgetting 
signified freedom from prosecution and the ability to avoid responsibility for serious human 
rights violations (Encarnación, 2008). Crimes committed on the left, although they were lesser 
compared to the crimes of the right, were also ignored (Encarnación, 2008). While the right was 
responsible for systematically murdering around 200,000 Republicans during the Civil War, the 
left was also responsible for atrocities including the death of around 50,000 Nationalists, 
although casualty estimates vary per scholar (Greenspan, 2016). The Amnesty Law granted 
pensions to Republican Civil War veterans and permitted dismissed civil servants to return to 
their jobs (Encarnación, 2008). While the Pacto de olvido and 1977 Amnesty Law had benefits 
for both sides, the benefits were greater for the right. The right escaped responsibility for large-
scale human rights abuses during the Civil War and dictatorship, and a new norm inhibited 
acknowledgement and discussion of the Civil War and Franco regime (Encarnación, 2008). 
Since the right had more governmental authority and control, they were able to obtain favorable 
terms that limited accountability for their crimes.  
The transition through transaction nature of the democratic transition inhibited 
transitional justice. Transitions through transactions are less conducive to transitional justice 
compared to transitions through defeat or a breakdown because former authoritarian officials 
maintain the most bargaining power. In Spain, the transition through transaction granted the 
political right greater power than the political left, which permitted the right to negotiate from a 
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better position. This power dynamic allowed the political right to avoid responsibility for their 
crimes. While the Spanish democratic transition was aimed at preventing renewed violence, 
crimes were not addressed and victims received no official recognition or reparations (Govan, 
2008). Acknowledging violations and recognizing victims would have required the right to 
address their wrong-doings. The right did not want to address their wrong-doings because taking 
responsibility for their crimes was not in their best interest. Acknowledging crimes and 
recognizing victims could have opened the doors to mass leftist critique of the right, as well as 
instigated disunity and instability in the country.  
The Spanish democratic transition inhibited elements of transitional justice that 
acknowledged crimes and recognized victims, but included supplemental aspects of transitional 
justice such as returning order and trust to society. Restoring order and trust occurred through a 
series of government reforms. Creating accountable and trustworthy institutions, improving the 
justice system, maintaining respect for the rule of law, and facilitating a durable resolution to the 
conflict are complementary aims of transitional justice that were present in Spain. The 
democratic transition focused on building a successful democracy over transitional justice.  
 
IV. The fear element:  
 Fear of renewed violence and instability inhibited transitional justice in Spain. Spaniards 
wanted their blossoming democracy to succeed, and fear served as motivation to negotiate and 
make concessions. Societal desire for stability contributed to the creation of the Pacto de olvido 
and 1977 Amnesty Law. Spaniards were motivated to ignore the country’s history of violence 
given the tumultuous unpredictability of ETA violence and the military coup d’état. Transitional 
justice was not a priority because the democratic future of the country was unclear.  
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Spaniards anticipated a “harsh and frightful” democratic transition due to the country’s 
unstable history with changes in political power (Humlebæk, 2007). Change in political authority 
had not occurred since the Second Republic, and the governance of the Second Republic was 
rocked by political polarization, the Revolution of 1934, and Franco’s military uprising, which 
culminated in the Spanish Civil War. Despite briefly experiencing democracy during the Second 
Republic, the volatility of this period did not produce a strong democratic legacy for politicians 
and citizens to look towards when structuring the new democracy. While the populace desired 
democratic reforms, transitioning into democracy after the instability of the Second Republic and 
the authoritarianism of Franco’s dictatorship made citizens wary of the feasibility of democracy 
(Encarnación, 2008). After suffering under dictatorship for 39 years, actions that threatened 
democratic success were undesirable. Stability and safety were priorities over transitional justice.  
The right and left instituted the Pacto de olvido and 1977 Amnesty Law to keep the peace 
between them. The agreement was made to improve the transition to democracy and to ensure 
stability. Political elites from both ideological perspectives feared that “opening old wounds” 
would inhibit the democratization of Spain by instigating another civil war or dictatorship. Fear 
of democratic failure based on Spain’s violent history with transitions combined with ETA 
terrorism and the military coup d’état contributed to the emphasis on peace and stability 
throughout the democratic transition instead of accountability and justice (Encarnación, 2008).  
Political elites instituted policies of forgetting based on the opinions of citizens. 
According to opinion polls, 61% of the population approved of complete amnesty after Franco’s 
death (Ortega, 1985). Political elites created policies of forgetting without fear of criticism from 
the population because there was a lack of social demand to acknowledge the past. Politicians, 
the populace, and the media desired stability and forgetting over transitional justice. 
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(Encarnación, 2008). Support for forgetting and amnesty arose among citizens who feared 
responsibility for complicity in Franco’s regime and victims who felt shamed and silenced 
(Encarnación, 2008). New political leaders struggled to fully grasp the magnitude of the human 
rights abuses because decades had passed since the Civil War and early, violent years of the 
dictatorship. These political leaders were not actual fighters or direct victims of human rights 
abuses. (Encarnación, 2008). There was a “memory gap” between “those who actually lived the 
war and those who experienced its consequences,” which was further complicated as facts about 
violence were unclear and suffered from regime distortion (Encarnación, 2008). Political elites 
perceived policies of forgetting and amnesty to be quick solutions to the complex and violent 
context of the transitional period. Striving for transitional justice could have instigated more 
disunity and trouble.  
The threat of terrorism fostered a culture of fear among citizens who craved stability 
throughout the transitional period. The ETA was founded in 1959, and before Franco’s death in 
1975, the ETA had already killed 44 people (Ceberio Belaza, 2018). The assassination of Carrero 
Blanco represented the ETA’s potential for violence (Aizpeolea, 2013). When ETA violence 
increased dramatically during the transitional years, the culture of fear grew. While most attacks 
were located in Basque Country and were aimed at government officials or security personnel, 
attacks also occurred in neighboring northern Spanish regions, Madrid, and Barcelona, as well as 
frequently injured civilians who were in the wrong place at the wrong time. Spaniards feared 
terrorism and violence instigated by the ETA, and desired stability and comfort (Ceberio Belaza, 
2018). Transitional justice was not the priority because feeling secure was more important to the 
population.  
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El Tejerazo, the failed military coup led by Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero Molina, 
was instigated over frustration with ETA terrorism and their demands for greater regional 
autonomy (McLean, 2006). Tejero and his ultra-conservative supporters desired a unified, 
centralized Spain instead of regional autonomy (McLean, 2006). The threat of terrorism, which 
was often directed at police and military personnel, likely increased the desire of Tejero to act 
(McLean, 2006). While the military coup was unsuccessful, it served as a reminder of the 
fragility of democracy to all Spaniards. It also demonstrated how fear and terrorism could shake 
the stability of the democracy, and proved that persistence was required to maintain the 
democracy. It added to the value politicians and citizens placed upon stability over transitional 
justice because democracy was truly threatened.  
 Before El Tejerazo, between the years of 1979 and 1980, a couple of leftist controlled 
local governments boldly began exhuming and reburying Republican graves. These exhumations 
were direct violations of the Pacto de olvido. The most notable case was in Torremejía, a village 
in which 33 Republicans killed by Franco’s forces were exhumed in 1979. The mayor of the 
village was brought to court for authorizing public funds for the exhumation. While the case was 
eventually dropped, exhumation of Republican graves came to a screeching halt after Tejero’s 
attempted coup (Encarnación, 2008). The failed coup reminded citizens of the fragility of the 
new democracy and no more exhumations occurred between 1981 and 2000 (Encarnación, 
2008). While some leftist Spaniards may have desired the acknowledgement of crimes and 
recognition of victims, the fear of upsetting the democracy prevailed, particularly after 
democracy was directly threatened by General Tejero. The attempted coup increased feelings of 
uncertainty and fear among Spaniards, which paused transitional justice for decades. 
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Fear inhibited transitional justice because Spaniards were more concerned with stability 
and safety instead of accountability. Transitional justice becomes less of a concern when 
individuals feel like their lives or futures are threatened. Spaniards were less inclined to seek 
increased transitional justice as they did not want to upset the new, fragile democracy 
(Encarnación, 2008). The lack of a desire to approach transitional justice was maintained by 
most of the public until the 2000’s when greater demands for transitional justice were brought to 
popular attention through human rights organizations (Encarnación, 2008).  
 
V. Conclusion:  
The Spanish democratic transition resulted in limited transitional justice because key 
elements of transitional justice such as the redress and acknowledgement of violations, as well as 
the recognition of the dignity of individuals were actively prevented. Even though the foundation 
for transitional justice was established through changing morals, values, and attitudes, the 
country was more concerned with creating a stable, safe democracy over transitional justice. The 
nature of the transition through transaction and fear inhibited the approach of primary aims of 
transitional justice. Efforts to attain transitional justice in the 2000’s were more successful given 
the greater base of support, passage of time, decreased fear, and political and physical stability. 
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Chapter 4: Understanding Chile 
I. Introduction: 
  The democratic transition in Chile manifested differently than the democratic transition 
in Spain. The 1988 Chilean national plebiscite, in which citizens voted on the continuation of the 
military dictatorship, instigated the democratic transition in Chile. The population voted against 
the continuation of the regime, leading to constitutional reforms and the election of a leftist 
president in 1989. Chile transitioned to democracy after a collective vote, while Spain 
transitioned after Franco’s death upended the longevity of the dictatorship. A leftist government 
attained power in Chile, while the right maintained governing power in Spain. In Chile, a truth 
commission was created in 1990 to report on incidences of human rights abuses, however, 
perpetrators of violence escaped prosecution because of protection from amnesty laws. Amnesty 
laws protected perpetrators in both Spain and Chile, but Spaniards strove to forget their past 
while the Chilean truth commission acknowledged crimes and recognized victims. This chapter 
will discuss the democratic transition process in Chile, which will serve as context in the 
following chapter’s analysis of how Chile’s democratic transition influenced the extent of 
transitional justice in post-dictatorship society. It will serve as evidence for how increased 
transitional justice manifested in Chile compared to Spain. Firstly, this chapter will outline the 
defeat of the Chilean dictatorship in the national plebiscite. Secondly, this chapter will discuss 
the process of transferring power between Pinochet’s regime and the left. Thirdly, this chapter 
will examine the rise of President Aylwin’s government and policies.  
 
II. Downfall of the Chilean dictatorship:  
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After assuming control of the country on September 11, 1973, the military junta in Chile 
sought to consolidate power. On September 11, 1980, the junta authorized a constitutional 
referendum to replace the 1925 Constitution with a new, more authoritarian document. 
According to the junta, 67% of the population voted in favor of the constitutional change, 
however, a lack of voting safeguards signified that the actual percentage of the population that 
supported the new form of government may differ from the official number (International 
Commission, 1989). The 1980 Constitution institutionalized Pinochet’s military junta and 
granted significant powers to the president while weakening Congress (Kandell, 2006). Military 
power was augmented through the establishment of a National Security Council, which gave the 
military a tutelary role over all state institutions (Malinarich, 2000). The council had the right to 
interject on matters that they believed influenced the safety of the country (Malinarich, 2000). 
The junta was established as Chile’s governing body, but the document called for a national 
plebiscite in 1988 to determine the political future of the country. Citizens would vote either 
YES or NO to the continuation of the military junta and Pinochet’s presidency for an additional 
eight years. 
As the plebiscite approached, politically-minded individuals split into a YES faction and 
a NO faction. The YES side was supported by Pinochet, the armed forces, property owners, and 
business groups. The YES campaign stressed order, national security, and political and economic 
stability and progress. The NO faction was dominated by the “Command for the No,” which 
brought 16 different political parties together into a coalition. The Christian Democrats (DC) 
were the largest party in the group, and thus became the leaders of the coalition. The DC’s 
president, Patricio Aylwin, served as the coalition’s spokesperson. The socialist faction, 
Communist Party, union leaders, intellectuals, students, human rights organizations, and the 
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international community backed the NO side. The NO campaign used its limited allotted 
television time to advertise for a happy future with hope and reconciliation. These 
advertisements helped convince the public that they should not fear voting NO (International 
Commission, 1989).  
 Leading up to the 1988 plebiscite, the junta prepared for winning re-election. In the 
weeks prior to the plebiscite, the junta utilized authoritative measures to restrict the opposition 
and enhance the odds of electoral success. The regime registered their partisans to vote before 
others in the country, as well as pressured members of the armed forces, public employees, and 
poor people dependent on government subsidies to vote YES. Private business owners also 
pressured their workers to vote YES. The junta used government resources and their control of 
the media to advocate for a YES victory. Small concessions were made to the NO side, such as 
permitting limited use of the media, prolonging the voter registration period, loosening 
restrictions on public meetings and rallies, and allowing exiles to return to Chile (International 
Commission, 1989).  
The actual voting process was increasingly democratic compared to the authoritative 
measures utilized by the regime to ensure a YES win. Counter-fraud measures were employed to 
ensure voting integrity. While the junta objected to a truly free plebiscite, they wanted the 
domestic and international community to see the plebiscite as “a valid expression of public 
opinion.” The junta wanted to win the plebiscite validly to boost the legitimacy of the regime, 
uphold the laws of their 1980 Constitution, avoid the discontent that follows rigged elections, 
appease the international community, and encourage the NO side to participate. NO participation 
was considered important because the YES side believed that the YES faction would win. The 
military junta wanted to maintain the purity of their victory by objectively beating the NO side. 
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The regime felt external pressure to act democratically from neighboring countries that had 
transitioned to democracy, as well as from the United States, which no longer supported 
Pinochet. The regional spread of democracy and human rights norms resulted in a poor 
international perception of Chile, and holding a valid plebiscite would help recuperate the 
regime’s image. The military junta was also overconfident. The regime believed that they would 
succeed because they had won previous plebiscites, maintained control over voting procedures, 
perceived the opposition as fractured, utilized government resources and personnel for support, 
maintained backing from economic elites, and offered continuity and stability compared to a NO 
victory, which would result in a restructuring of the political system (International Commission, 
1989).  
 The plebiscite was held on October 5, 1988 and 90% of the voting population cast their 
opinion. The NO alliance won the plebiscite with 54.71% of the vote compared to the YES side 
which obtained 43.01% of the vote. The results signified that Pinochet and the military junta 
would leave power on May 11, 1990 (International Commission, 1989). 
 
III. Chile’s democratic transition:  
Following their victory, the NO alliance recognized that Pinochet still received 43% of 
the vote, which represented a large portion of society. The NO side decided against complete 
condemnation of the regime since they did not want to provoke the military. Because the 1980 
Constitution was rigid and difficult to alter by nature, the NO supporters predicted difficulties in 
modifying the document after the transition of power to the left. Reforming the Constitution 
democratically after the transition would be challenging due to structural provisions that were 
intrinsically biased towards the right. The NO camp sought to negotiate with the junta to obtain 
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constitutional reforms before ascending to office. Negotiating before officially obtaining power 
would help the left amend the Constitution in ways that would otherwise be too difficult to 
change democratically. The left desired constitutional reforms that would reduce the right-
leaning bias, which allowed the right to obtain a disproportionate number of seats in Congress. 
Before the transition, the junta had the authority and capability to work with the left to make 
these changes (Hudson, 1994).  
Moderate members of the junta were willing to discuss potential reforms to the 1980 
Constitution. These moderates worried that if the left was not placated through small 
constitutional reforms, then the left would completely disregard the Constitution in favor of 
something new. Disregarding the 1980 Constitution would decimate the political and economic 
“progress” that the right had made throughout the 16 years of military rule. Negotiations would 
protect aspects of the Constitution and solidify it as the legitimate successor to the 1925 
Constitution. The military also desired constitutional reforms to ensure the autonomy of the 
military on internal matters. Anticipating the election of a new leftist government, the military 
wanted these reforms to protect their independence. The right and the left understood the value 
of cooperating over fighting, especially because the results of the plebiscite revealed the 
politically divided nature of the country (Hudson, 1994).  
Ultimately, the reformed Constitution passed in a referendum on July 30, 1989. Fifty-four 
amendments were approved by 85.7% of voters, with both sides viewing the results as a relative 
success (Hudson, 1994). While the right had to relinquish some power, they celebrated that the 
basic design of their original constitution was upheld and ratified, which officially legitimized 
the document as the replacement of the 1925 Constitution (Hudson, 1994). The military also 
obtained the self-governing autonomy that it desired (Hudson, 1994). The left obtained moderate 
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democratic reforms, although they perceived these amendments as the first step to additional 
future reforms (Hudson, 1994). Successful modifications to the Constitution achieved by the left 
included punishing groups based on threatening actions rather than opinions, permitting labor 
and association leaders to join political parties, requiring the court to consider habeas corpus in 
all cases, and prohibiting exile as a form of punishment (Hudson, 1994). The National Security 
Council’s mandate was modified to make it an advisory body instead of an enforcement body 
(Hudson, 1994). The comptroller general was given a seat on the council to prevent a military 
majority within the body and diminish military power (Hudson, 1994). Compared to the original 
1980 Constitution, the new Constitution augmented the powers of Congress and decreased the 
powers of the president (Hudson, 1994). The finalized document altered the constitutional 
amendment process to make it easier to pass future democratic reforms, but the document still 
held right-leaning bias. Pinochet maintained the right to appoint a significant number of senators 
and the military retained a role in governance (Chile, 1992). The left insisted that more reforms 
would be necessary in the future to create a more balanced governmental system (Hudson, 1994).  
 
IV. Rise of the new Chilean government:  
On December 14, 1989, Chile officially elected Patricio Aylwin to serve as the next 
president. Aylwin ran as the leader of the Coalition of Parties for Democracy (CPD), which was 
comprised of the parties that voted NO during the plebiscite. Aylwin obtained 55.2% of the vote, 
representing a clear victory over his opponents. Hernán Büchi Buc, who was backed by the 
Democracy and Progress coalition composed of far-right individuals through the Independent 
Democratic Union and center-right individuals through the National Renewal, received 29.4% of 
the votes. Francisco Javier Errázuriz Talavera, who ran on a populist platform backed by small 
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parties that unified in the Unity for Democracy coalition, received 15.4% of the votes (Hudson, 
1994).  
 The CPD obtained the most available seats in both the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Senate, but failed to obtain a majority in either house due to constitutional provisions that still 
favored the right. Obtaining a CPD majority was difficult because Pinochet appointed a minority 
of designated senators. In order to pass legislation or amendments the new leftist government 
needed to compromise either with Pinochet’s designated senators or senators that were elected 
on a right-leaning platform. The need to negotiate limited Aylwin’s ability to institute human 
right policies since human rights initiatives were frequently blocked or diluted by conservatives 
(Chile, 1992).  
 Political disagreement between the right and the left was evident in the case of still 
imprisoned political prisoners from the Pinochet regime. The left sought leniency for political 
prisoners who committed acts of political violence, but rightist legislators drastically weakened 
leftist proposals for legal reform. Conservatives maintained their beliefs that these political 
prisoners posed a security threat to the country. Congress was unable to grant the political 
prisoners mercy, but the government utilized other tactics, such as presidential pardons and 
acquittals, to secure the release of some prisoners (Chile, 1992)  
President Aylwin’s government promised to establish the truth about the regime’s crimes, 
but the new administration was also wary of upsetting the military and citizens who supported 
the right (Christian, 1990). Aylwin quickly established the National Commission on Truth and 
Reconciliation to “document human rights abuses resulting in death or disappearance during the 
years of military rule, from September 11, 1973 to March 11, 1990” (Truth Commission, 1990). 
The commission’s mandate did not include torture and other forms of abuse that did not 
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conclude with death. The body, known as the Rettig Commission because it was chaired by Raúl 
Rettig, operated between May 1990 and February 1991. The commission was comprised of eight 
commissioners, two women and six men, chosen by President Aylwin. Four commissioners were 
former Pinochet supporters and the other four had opposed the regime (Fletcher, 2014). The 
commission issued an 1,800-page report upon completion, which President Aylwin presented to 
the public. The report concluded that 3,438 individuals were disappeared, tortured, and killed as 
a result of a “planned and coordinated strategy of the government” (Truth Commission, 1990). A 
large portion of the responsibility for governmental oppression was given to the National 
Intelligence Directorate (DINA) (Truth Commission, 1990). The report recommended 
reparations for victims, which included “symbolic measures” as well as “significant legal, 
financial, medical, and administrative assistance” (Truth Commission, 1990). The commission 
also advised the adoption of human rights laws, the strengthening of Chilean civilian authority in 
society and the justice system, and the creation of an ombudsman's office (Truth Commission, 
1990). 
President Aylwin fully endorsed the report and publicly asked victims, families of 
victims, and the Chilean people to forgive the state for its crimes. Congress quickly passed a 
unanimous resolution to praise the commission and its report. The Aylwin administration created 
the National Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation, which provided continual financial 
support to families of victims listed in the report. This body was also charged with continuing 
investigations that the original commission failed to finish (Truth Commission, 1990). 
Reparations were limited to families of victims that met the mandate of the commission, 
therefore victims of torture and other abuses that did not result in disappearance or death were 
not compensated (Truth Commission, 1990). Aylwin and the report advocated for crimes to be 
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investigated, despite the inability to prosecute perpetrators due to amnesty laws (Chilean 
National Commission, 1993). The commission did not name individual perpetrators of violence 
in the report, but it sent the courts incriminating evidence. The commission felt that naming 
specific perpetrators was a violation of due process because it was the court’s responsibility to 
determine guilt or innocence (Chile, 1992).  
While the Rettig Commission uncovered incidences of human rights violations, Pinochet 
and members of his regime were protected from prosecution. Upon transition to democracy 
Pinochet stepped down as president, but he retained power by maintaining his position as 
commander in chief of the armed forces. As commander in chief, Pinochet protected the military 
from punishment for abuses perpetuated throughout the dictatorship (Christian, 1990). The 1978 
Amnesty Law passed by the junta also prevented members of the regime from being prosecuted 
for human rights abuses committed before 1978 (Marengo, 2015). The Rettig Report discovered 
that most crimes committed by the dictatorship occurred between 1974 and 1977, thus they were 
covered by the Amnesty Law (Truth Commission, 1990). President Aylwin’s administration was 
incapable of repealing the law without a legislative majority in Congress. The Supreme Court, 
surrounded by significant controversy, also granted the military courts jurisdiction over crimes 
committed after 1978 (Chile, 1992). The military courts lapsed in their investigation of human 
rights abuses, leaving perpetrators of violence unaccountable for their crimes (Chile, 1992). 
Numerous human rights violators maintained their positions in the military throughout the 
transition (Chile, 1992). Prosecutions were absent throughout the democratic transition.  
The Chilean population had mixed reactions towards the Rettig Report. On the left, 
numerous Chileans and human rights activists criticized the Rettig Report for its limited scope. 
They believed that more “truth” needed to be uncovered and lamented the commission’s inability 
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to identify perpetrators or locate missing bodies (Chile, 1992). On the right, the military 
outwardly rejected the report (Chilean National Commission, 1993). The military perceived itself 
as the institution that saved Chile from the instability of the Allende administration and the threat 
of socialism. While the military did not explicitly deny the report, they stressed the historical 
context and necessity of the coup d’état (Chile, 1992).  
President Aylwin was concerned with bringing light to the human rights violations that 
transpired, but he was also responsible for ensuring stability. President Aylwin halted efforts to 
implement the recommendations of the Rettig Report soon after its release due to an upsurge in 
attacks instigated by armed leftist groups (Fletcher, 2014). These attacks notably resulted in the 
assassination of Jaime Guzmán, a right-wing leader and Pinochet advisor (Fletcher, 2014). 
Conservative politicians proposed the creation of a strong anti-terrorism campaign to counteract 
bombings, shootings, and robberies by extreme leftist groups (Chile, 1992). Aylwin had to 
balance between recognizing crimes and acknowledging victims, while maintaining stability and 
fostering reconciliation between society and the military.   
 
V. Conclusion:  
After seizing power through a coup d’état against President Salvador Allende, Pinochet 
and the armed forces installed a military junta to govern Chile. The junta used repressive tactics 
to maintain power, but sought to legitimize their governance through a new constitution and a 
national plebiscite to determine the continuation of the regime. The plebiscite’s voting process 
involved authoritarian and democratic measures, but the population ultimately voted against the 
continuation of Pinochet and his regime. The left and right negotiated to reform the Constitution 
and governmental structure. Patricio Aylwin was elected president, and he used his authority to 
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create a truth commission. Incidences of human rights violations were reported, however, 
perpetrators of abuse escaped prosecution due to amnesty laws. Chile’s democratic transition 
required the need to balance peace, truth, and justice. This delicate balance affected the extent of 
transitional justice achieved in post-dictatorship Chile. 
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Chapter 5: Transitional Justice in Chile 
I. Introduction: 
 Chile’s democratic transition resulted in more transitional justice as compared to Spain, 
but transitional justice still faced restrictions. Chile acknowledged crimes and recognized victims 
within the constraints they faced, while Spain ignored their history of human rights abuses. 
Chile’s history with democracy, the spread of human rights norms throughout Latin America, 
and changing U.S. foreign policy created a climate that set the stage for democracy and human 
rights-based polices. While Chile’s decision to transition happened democratically and the 
election of the left to the presidency increased the ability of the country to attain transitional 
justice, the need to negotiate between the right and the left limited transitional justice. Leftist 
political authority permitted the creation of a truth commission, which dramatically increased the 
extent of transitional justice possible, however, limits were imposed based on the commission’s 
structure and the need to maintain peace. Durable amnesty laws inhibited perpetrators of human 
rights abuses from being brought to justice, and efforts to reverse amnesty laws risked provoking 
the military.  
This chapter will analyze how the aspects of Chile’s democratic transition discussed in 
the previous chapter affected the extent of transitional justice achieved in post-dictatorship 
society. Comparisons will periodically be made between the Spanish case and the Chilean case 
to demonstrate how Chile obtained increased transitional justice compared to Spain. First, this 
chapter will analyze how historical context laid the foundation for democracy and human rights 
policies. Second, this chapter will examine how the type of transition in Chile limited the extent 
of transitional justice. Third, this chapter will discuss how the truth commission augmented the 
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acknowledgement of crimes and recognition of victims. Lastly, this chapter will analyze how 
amnesty laws impeded the ability to hold perpetrators of violence accountable.  
 
II. Setting the stage for a successful democratic transition:  
Prior to Pinochet’s 1973 coup d’état, Chile had a strong history with democracy. Chile 
maintained a democratic system of governance in the decades leading up to 1973. The 
country’s long history with democracy was a source of pride for many Chileans considering the 
tumultuous nature of other Latin American and European countries. Chile viewed its 
democratic transition as a return to democracy rather than the creation of a new democracy. 
Chileans had knowledge on how to run an effective democracy, and over half of the population 
evidently desired to return to democracy based on their successful vote against the regime’s 
continued rule (Constable & Valenzuela, 1989).  
Anibal Perez-Linan and Scott Mainwaring (2013) studied regime legacies and their 
correlation with levels of democracy in Latin American countries. The study focused on Latin 
American countries that transitioned during and after the third wave of democratization. The 
research demonstrated that countries with stronger democratic legacies were more successful in 
creating durable democracies after their transition from authoritarian rule. Countries with a 
democratic history can reproduce democracy easier as they can recreate memories of political 
parties and legal institutions. Perez-Linan and Mainwaring list Chile as an example of a country 
whose strong democratic history helped them rebuild a stable democracy after their transition. 
Because Chile lived under dictatorship for 16 years, political elites, such as Patricio Aylwin, 
who emerged as leaders before the coup d’état were still alive and capable of participating in 
the reinstitution of democracy (Perez-Linan & Mainwaring, 2013).  
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Chile’s history with democracy allowed it to transition to democracy with more 
confidence. Confidence rather than fear regarding the ability to successfully transition to 
democracy permitted limited steps towards transitional justice. Elements of transitional justice 
that aligned with creating a stable democracy were prevalent in Chile. Complementary aims of 
transitional justice such as creating accountable and trustworthy institutions, improving the 
justice system, maintaining respect for the rule of law, and facilitating a durable resolution to 
the conflict were immediate goals of Chilean politicians. Increased confidence of leftist 
Chileans in the stability of the democracy also permitted primary goals of transitional justice to 
make headway. Chile’s faith in their democracy permitted President Aylwin’s government to 
publicly report crimes and support victims since politicians and citizens were not paralyzed by 
fear as they were in Spain. Spain’s short-lived democratic Second Republic was rocked by 
instability and violence, while Chile’s decades of democracy prior to the coup d’état established 
a foundation of knowledge regarding how to operate a democracy. This knowledge helped 
Chilean politicians confidently restructure Pinochet’s dictatorship into democracy, and thus 
permitted transitional justice to be part of the transition. Additionally, democratic memories and 
leaders were still alive in Chile but not in Spain because the dictatorship lasted 16 years in 
Chile and 36 years in Spain. Spaniards lived under dictatorship for more than twice as long as 
Chileans. While modernization steered Spain towards democracy, Spaniards preceded less 
confidently towards democracy than Chile because Chile’s strong democratic legacy permitted 
increased confidence in democratic success. Chile thus pursued increased transitional justice 
during their transition because they were more confident in their new democracy and did not 
face as much fear as Spain. 
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 Chile’s transition to democracy occurred during a significant period in Latin American 
history. During the late twentieth century, most Latin American countries had transitioned or 
were transitioning into democracy (Lutz and Sikkink, 2000). These new Latin American 
democracies passed laws to comply with international human rights norms (Lutz & Sikkink, 
2000). Lutz and Sikkink (2000) found that the growing emphasis on human rights norms could 
be explained by “a broad norms shift between the late 1970s and the mid-1990s that led to 
increased regional consensus concerning an interconnected bundle of human rights norms, 
including the norms against torture and disappearance and the norm for democratic governance.” 
These norms were given legal and political support to enhance their legitimacy and ensure 
compliance by the transitioning governments (Lutz & Sikkink, 2000). Within this “human rights 
norms cascade,” Lutz and Sikkink (2001) noted the existence of the “justice cascade.” The 
“justice cascade” was made possible through transitional justice advocacy by human rights 
activists who sought to hold perpetrators of human rights abuses accountable in foreign or 
domestic courts (Lutz & Sikkink, 2001).  
The United States, which previously backed Latin American dictators who utilized 
human rights abuses to maintain control, reduced their staunch anti-communist foreign policies 
that shaped the early Cold War era (McMahon, 2009). While preventing communism in Latin 
America remained important to the U.S., promoting democracy and human rights also became a 
central aspect of foreign policy (Constable & Valenzuela, 1989). This policy shift began with the 
Carter administration’s advocacy for democracy, human rights, and peace on an international 
scale (McMahon, 2009). The U.S. specifically reversed its support for the Pinochet regime twice. 
First, in 1976 when Orlando Letelier, a former foreign minister for Allende, was murdered by 
Chilean security forces in Washington, D.C. This incident prompted the United States to sever 
 	
58 
U.S.-Chilean military ties completely (Constable & Valenzuela, 1989). Second, Ronald Reagan’s 
election to the presidency brought policies that were more sympathetic to anticommunist 
dictators and their worth as allies, however, by 1985 policymakers determined that military rule 
in Chile was only strengthening communist groups (Constable & Valenzuela, 1989). 
Additionally, the Reagan administration wanted to legitimize its fight against the leftist 
government in Nicaragua by publicly condemning human rights abuses by Chile, a rightist ally 
of the U.S. (Constable & Valenzuela, 1989). In 1988, the U.S. Ambassador to Chile promoted 
fair voting procedures in the plebiscite determining the future of Pinochet’s regime (Constable & 
Valenzuela, 1989).  
The “human rights norms cascade” and changing U.S. policies in favor of democracy and 
human rights pushed Chile to transition into democracy. Pressure from foreign and domestic 
human rights activists, NGOs, IGOs, and governments served as motivators to implement human 
rights norms (Lutz & Sikkink, 2001). Implementing human rights norms satiated the desires of 
liberal citizens and legitimized the new Chilean democracy to the international community, 
which was watching and willing to critique injustices. The growing prominence of human rights 
increased the extent of transitional justice achieved in post-dictatorship Chilean society because 
the implementation of human rights polices permitted Chile to address the three major goals of 
transitional justice: “the recognition of the dignity of individuals, the redress and 
acknowledgment of violations, and the aim to prevent them from happening again” (ICTJ, n.d.). 
The country initially recognized the dignity of individuals and attempted to redress and 
acknowledge crimes through the establishment of the truth and reparations commissions. 
Additionally, governmental reforms granting Chileans more freedoms and rights diminished the 
capacity for future human rights abuses. Chile adopted foreign and domestic human rights laws 
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against torture, forced disappearance, and murder. While the value of human rights was 
spreading through Europe, Spain was unable to take great steps towards transitional justice due 
to fear of instability. Spain granted citizens more civil and political rights to protect human 
rights, but did little to recognize past abuses. Truth commissions were not common during the 
years of Spain’s transition, and the Pacto de olvido and 1977 Amnesty Law prevented discussion 
of abuses. Since the mid-2000s, Spain has begun to address previous human rights violations due 
to domestic and international pressure, but that is a more recent development in Spain compared 
to Chile where recognition of abuses began during the democratic transition.  
Despite changing attitudes towards the value of human rights, transitional justice 
remained limited. President Aylwin halted the implementation of the Rettig Report’s 
recommendations due to an increase in violence by the far-left against the political right 
(Fletcher, 2014). The 1978 Amnesty Law prevented prosecution of Pinochet and other 
perpetrators of human rights abuses until Pinochet’s 1998 arrest and extradition request (Truth 
Commission, 1990). Transitional justice faced restrictions due to the realities and possibilities of 
the period. The immediate post-dictatorship Chilean society witnessed the recognition of crimes 
and support for victims, but transitional justice was paused when it proved too dangerous or 
unfeasible. The extent of transitional justice achieved in immediate post-dictatorship Chilean 
society was affected by the nature of the democratic transition, the truth commission, and 
amnesty.  
 
III. Nature of the democratic transition in Chile:  
 	
60 
In Chile, Pinochet stepped down after losing the national plebiscite, which permitted 
constitutional negotiations and democratic elections. The death of Franco served as a catalyst 
for Spain to end Francoism, while the national referendum instigated the changes in Chile. 
In Chile, the referendum was significant because citizens voted for the future of their country, 
rather than waiting until Pinochet died or the regime crumbled. By democratically voting NO in 
the plebiscite, over half of Chileans demonstrated their interest in democratic reforms. Voting 
NO implied that an individual desired the end of the military junta and hoped for the 
liberalization of society. While both the YES and NO side were wary of the other rioting or 
refusing to accept the outcome of the plebiscite, political leaders on both sides stressed the 
importance of peace (International Commission, 1989). Chile proceeded more confidently 
towards democracy than Spain because both sides of the political spectrum agreed to abide by 
the results of the plebiscite. The fear of renewed violence existed in Chile, but it was lessened 
since the democratic nature of the decision to end the dictatorship legitimized the need to 
transition from authoritarianism.  
 The democratic nature of the decision to transition increased trust that the transition 
would happen. If Pinochet’s forces decided to forcibly maintain the dictatorship, then they would 
have been acting in violation of their own constitution. They would have destroyed their 
legitimacy with the international community, which desired democratic changes in Chile 
(International Commission, 1989). Because Chileans decided to transition collectively through a 
democratic practice, they had more faith that the transition would occur. While fear existed, 
transitional justice was augmented because Chileans and the new government were increasingly 
confident that democracy would come. Since Spain transitioned after Franco’s death, the 
prospects of democracy were unclear. Franco had prepared successors to continue his legacy and 
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the dictatorship, but increasingly vocal leftists and the King decided to break with Franco’s 
desires. Leftists in both countries desired democracy, but democracy was expected in Chile after 
Pinochet conceded, while the path to democracy was uncertain in Spain. Chile needed to balance 
divides between conservatives and liberals when discussing human rights violations, but 
Chileans felt that transitional justice could be addressed without fear that the democracy would 
crumble. Spain lacked assurance of democratic success and fear of instability halted transitional 
justice efforts.  
Chile’s democratic transition can be categorized using Scott Mainwaring’s (1989) theory 
on transitions through defeat, transitions through breakdown, transitions through transaction, and 
transitions through extrication. While Pinochet’s regime was defeated in the polls, they were not 
defeated militarily and a significant portion of the population still supported the dictatorship. 
Chile’s democratic transition resides between the transition through extrication segment and the 
transition through transaction segment of Mainwaring’s (1989) model. Chile resides in the 
middle of these segments of Mainwaring’s (1989) model because the authoritarian government 
was significantly weakened (demonstrated by their loss in the plebiscite), but the junta still 
negotiated with the opposition (the left) from a position of strength. Their position of strength 
came from the necessity of the left and right to negotiate reforms to the 1980 Constitution before 
the transition of power to the left, as well as the right’s control of the armed forces. While many 
former members of the dictatorship were replaced when President Aylwin took power, members 
of the right were important figures in the constitutional negotiations and Pinochet remained the 
commander in chief of the military. Pinochet’s command of the military permitted him to 
maintain significant power after the transition, and amnesty rendered former members of the 
junta untouchable through the justice system.  
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The placement of Chile’s democratic transition on Mainwaring’s (1989) model is 
comparable to political sociologists Juan Linz’s and T. González de la fé’s (1990) 
interpretation of Chile’s transition as a “transición pactada” (a transition through agreement) 
rather than a “transición por ruptura” (a transition through rupture with the previous 
government). Linz and González de la fé (1990) noted that the democratic transition occurred 
through negotiations between the left and the right rather than a decisive break with the junta. 
No single side had all the power to make decisions. The opposing sides had to cooperate to 
create a solution on which both ends of the political spectrum could agree. In Chile, this 
manifested through the constitutional reform process. The 1980 Constitution included changes 
that the right and left desired, but the right was still dismayed by reforms that weakened their 
authority and changed their precedents, while the left still desired increased democratic reforms 
(International Commission, 1989). Neither side was completely pleased, but both sides 
recognized the need to negotiate and make concessions for the sake of a successful transition.   
The nature of Chile’s democratic transition affected the extent of transitional justice 
achieved in post-dictatorship society. The classification of Chile’s democratic transition as a 
transition that heavily involved negotiations is significant because transitions that require 
negotiations limit transitional justice. The left and the right wanted to maintain peace to ensure 
the survival of the country. The necessity of agreement during the transition limited the ability 
of Chile to manage their history of human rights abuses, and thus inhibited transitional justice. 
The left wanted increased transitional justice, but they initially had to restrict their goals due to 
the necessity of keeping the military tranquil. 
Transitional justice was limited due to the need for agreement and negotiation, but 
Chile’s democratic transition involved a different power dynamic than Spain’s democratic 
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transition. In Chile the left ascended to power. The left was elected to the presidency and 
obtained the most seats in Congress compared to other parties. The new government was 
increasingly capable of discussing the truth of human rights abuses because Aylwin ran on a 
platform that promised support to victims of human rights abuses. Creating a truth commission 
and making democratic reforms was expected by and appealed to Aylwin’s base. Aylwin had 
more flexibility in obtaining truth and reconciliation compared to the newly elected conservative 
government in Spain since President Aylwin and his base had the power to pursue transitional 
justice. Changing leadership from the right to the left in Chile was significant because, while 
former Franco officials maintained most of the power in Spain, the Chilean balance of power 
shifted to the left. The left in Chile was limited due to its lack of an absolute majority in 
Congress, but it could take increased steps towards transitional justice given its growing 
governmental authority. In Spain, the continuing power of the right inhibited transitional justice 
because the right did not want to take responsibility for their human rights violations throughout 
the Civil War and dictatorship.  
 
IV. Truth Commission:  
Soon after Chile’s return to democracy, President Aylwin created a truth commission to 
investigate human rights violations perpetrated by the dictatorship. The truth commission was 
able to be established given the national confidence in democracy and the transitional justice 
friendly context of Aylwin’s administration and political base. The truth commission allowed the 
country to obtain increased aspects of transitional justice since the truth of the violence 
committed by the dictatorship was publicly exposed. Because Chile transitioned into democracy 
with truth telling, the possibilities of transitional justice were augmented compared to Spain, 
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which prohibited talk of the past through the Pacto de olvido and 1977 Amnesty Law. Rather 
than ignore the past, the new Chilean government confronted the country’s history. Past violence 
was discussed, which permitted citizens to begin the process of reconciliation. Truth telling is a 
vital aspect of transitional justice, thus Chile’s increased dissemination of the truth allowed them 
to achieve a higher degree of transitional justice. 
The truth commission recommended the establishment of a reparations commission to 
support victims and their families, as well as advised the adoption of human rights laws, the 
strengthening of Chilean civilian authority, and the creation of an ombudsman’s office. The 
establishment of the truth commission and the recommendations that followed permitted victims 
to testify about the truth of their experiences and granted victims and their families validation 
and recognition from the state. This recognition was critical to the growth of transitional justice 
in Chile because two of the three central aims of transitional justice are “the recognition of the 
dignity of individuals” and the “redress and acknowledgement of violations” (ICTJ, n.d.). The 
aim to prevent human rights violations from happening again is the third goal of transitional 
justice, and the truth commission’s recommendations regarding human rights laws, civilian 
authority, and an ombudsman’s office reveal interest in preventing future human rights 
violations. The establishment of the truth commission during Chile’s democratic transition 
drastically increased the extent of transitional justice achieved in post-dictatorship Chile.  
The truth commission was a major step in the direction of transitional justice in Chile, but 
the limited mandate of the commission and the need to avoid the provocation of the right capped 
the growth of transitional justice. The commission’s mandate did not include torture and other 
forms of abuse that did not conclude with death, which excluded a large portion of victims from 
receiving recognition and support (Collins, 2017). Transitional justice was thus restricted 
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because not all victims of violence were acknowledged. While human rights activists critiqued 
the report for its limited scope, President Aylwin and Congress fully endorsed the report and 
asked the population to forgive the state.  
 President Aylwin established the truth commission and sought to implement its 
recommendations, however, as president, Aylwin was also tasked with maintaining the stability 
of the new democracy. Aylwin was wary of provoking the military, which outwardly rejected the 
Rettig Report. The United States Institute of Peace, which was tasked with translating the Rettig 
Report to English, commented on President Aylwin’s major considerations when determining 
how to shape his human rights policies. They noted that the goals of a new human rights policy 
were to “repair the damage caused by human rights violations both to individual victims and to 
the society as a whole; and to prevent such atrocities from ever happening again” (Chilean 
National Commission, 1993). Obtaining those goals was complicated for President Aylwin due 
to the political environment of the transition. Aylwin had to consider “the nature and extent of 
the human rights violations committed and the measure of investigation of the truth and justice 
for which they called; the restrictions imposed by the existing laws and institutions and by the 
likely reaction of the Chilean armed forces; the relevant experience of other countries; and the 
duties dictated by international human rights norms, as well as the position adopted on these 
issues by the international human rights community” (Chilean National Commission, 1993). All 
of these factors complicated the job of Aylwin, who had to work within the constitutional 
framework that existed while striving for transitional justice and maintaining stability. 
Transitional justice was a goal, but its growth was limited due to the realities of the transition.  
 After the Rettig Report was released, efforts to continue the implementation of its 
recommendations were paused due attacks by armed leftist groups against right-wing politicians 
 	
66 
(Fletcher, 2014). These attacks caused fear and uncertainty, which inhibited transitional justice 
because safety became a greater priority. These incidences of violence perpetrated by the armed 
left halted actions that could have furthered transitional justice. The cessation of efforts after 
armed leftist attacks demonstrates how fear of violence conflicts with the goals of transitional 
justice.  
 
V. Amnesty: 
The 1978 Amnesty Law was passed during the reign of the military junta to prevent the 
prosecution of all crimes that were committed before the passage of the law. This law covered 
most of the crimes committed. Additionally, the Supreme Court ruled that crimes committed 
after 1978 fell into the jurisdiction of military courts rather than civil courts. Despite the inability 
to prosecute human rights violators, Aylwin and the Rettig Report advocated for crimes to be 
investigated. While Aylwin was willing to support truth and investigation, he understood that 
prosecutions may have been risky given the strength of the military. The military strove to avoid 
accountability, and prosecutions may have resulted in instability. Furthermore, President 
Aylwin’s party did not enjoy a complete majority in Congress given the biased structure of the 
body. Because he did not have a majority, Aylwin was incapable of repealing the 1978 Amnesty 
Law (Chilean National Commission, 1993).  
The inability to prosecute perpetrators of human rights abuses limited transitional justice 
in Chile. The four most common approaches to transitional justice are criminal prosecutions, 
truth seeking, reparations, and reform (ICTJ, n.d.). Chile utilized truth-seeking, reparations, and 
reform, but did not engage in criminal prosecutions. Prosecuting criminals is often difficult in 
post-authoritarian and post-conflict societies that are still divided (ICTJ, n.d.). In Chile, 
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prosecuting human rights abuses was neither feasible given legal restrictions nor heavily desired 
by a large portion of the population due to the threat of instability.   
In Spain and Chile, the threat of military provocation if prosecutions were utilized was 
a major concern. If either country pushed for immediate prosecutions to obtain justice for 
victims, the military may have reacted and instigated renewed violence or destabilization. A 
military reaction endangered the survival of the new democracies. In Chile, the military 
maintained significant powers under the Constitution, and Pinochet’s position as commander in 
chief made the institution unappealing to provoke. The military was strong and unified, while 
the newly elected government was still learning how to govern. Neither country defeated their 
dictatorship through military might, therefore neither was in the position to defend itself against 
military retaliation. Maintaining peace was essential to secure the stability of the democracy. 
 
VI. Conclusion:  
As a transitioning society, Chile worked with the nature of its situation to build 
democracy and human rights policies that valued transitional justice. Chile’s democratic legacy, 
Latin America’s strengthening human rights norms, and the international community’s pressure 
fostered the creation of democracy and human rights-based polices in Chile. Chile’s democratic 
decision to transition and the rise of the left in politics permitted the country to pursue the 
primary aims of transitional justice. Transitional justice was constrained by fear, the need to 
negotiate, and the maintenance of stability, however, Chile strove to balance transitional justice 
with factors that opposed it. Chile’s truth commission permitted the recognition of human rights 
abuses and support for victims and their families, although efforts to attain transitional justice 
were halted when it became dangerous. Amnesty laws allowed perpetrators of human rights 
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violations to avoid responsibility and accountability for their crimes, and efforts to undue 
amnesty laws risked provoking the military. Chile’s democratic transition permitted a greater 
extent of transitional justice in post-dictatorship society compared to Spain despite the 
restrictions it faced. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
I. Introduction: 
 This study examined how the democratic transitions affected the extent of transitional 
justice achieved in post-dictatorship Spain and Chile. Chile achieved greater transitional justice 
compared to Spain because of its history with democracy, international advocacy for human 
rights, the rise of President Aylwin’s leftist government, and the creation of a truth commission. 
Transitional justice was limited in both Spain and Chile due to the need for political negotiations, 
fear of instability, and amnesty laws. While modernization contributed to democracy and human 
rights, Spain faced increased limitations on transitional justice because of the continuity of 
conservative governance under Prime Minister Suárez and increased fear of instability from 
democratic uncertainty, the attempted coup d’état, and ETA terrorism. The Pacto de olvido and 
1977 Amnesty Law inhibited the prosecution of human rights abusers and effectively prohibited 
efforts to acknowledge crimes and recognize victims in Spain by instituting a legal basis for 
“forgetting” history.  
This chapter will conclude my research. First, this chapter will discuss how Chile’s 
democratic transition resulted in increased transitional justice compared to Spain. Next, this 
chapter will examine the implications of my findings. Lastly, this chapter will discuss future 
points of interest regarding transitional justice in Spain and Chile.  
 
II. Summary of findings: 
Spain and Chile produced varying degrees of transitional justice due to the context of 
each democratic transition. The prospects of a successful democratic transition were uncertain in 
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Spain since Spaniards were unsure of democratic success. The primary aims of transitional 
justice, such as acknowledging crimes and recognizing victims, were not addressed during 
Spain’s transition because creating a successful democracy was the priority. In Chile, the 
democratic nature of the dictatorship’s end produced greater odds of democratic success. Chile’s 
democratic transition resulted in increased transitional justice compared to Spain because Chile 
could seek transitional justice without threatening the stability of the country.  
In Spain, the path to democracy was uncertain since democracy was never guaranteed. 
Spain’s previous attempt at democracy was during the Second Republic, which was a period 
rocked by conflict and instability. The Second Republic did not produce a strong democratic 
legacy to later assist Spain transition to democracy after Franco’s dictatorship. Transitioning to 
democracy was thus difficult because the country needed to learn how to build a stable, strong 
democracy. Between 1959 and 1975, modernization contributed to the desire for democracy as 
economic, social, cultural, and political changes contributed to a rising liberal population 
(Bernecker, 2007). This liberal population advocated for democratic reforms over 
authoritarianism, however, despite attitudinal shifts among growing leftists, Franco sought to 
ensure the regime’s longevity after his death by selecting successors who he thought would 
uphold his legacy (Carias, 2017). Prime Minister Carlos Arias Navarro and King Juan Carlos 
were tasked with maintaining the dictatorship after Franco’s death in 1975, but democratic 
pressure from the mounting liberal population motivated King Juan Carlos to openly critique 
Arias Navarro and the ultra-conservative right, which refused to adopt democratic reforms (Eder, 
1970). When Arias Navarro resigned in 1976 and the King selected Adolfo Suárez to serve as the 
next prime minister, the path to democratic reforms was opened for the first time in the 36 years. 
 	
71 
Chile was increasingly confident in their democratic transition compared to Spain. Before 
Pinochet’s coup d’état, Chile enjoyed a strong democratic past. Chile’s history with democracy 
permitted the country to perceive their democratic transition as a return to democracy rather than 
as the creation of a new democracy (Constable & Valenzuela, 1989). Memories and knowledge 
of how to operate a successful democracy facilitated the democratic transition (Constable & 
Valenzuela, 1989). The spread of democracy and human rights norms throughout Latin America, 
as well as pressure from the international community made the adoption of democratic reforms 
and human rights-based policies increasingly likely (Lutz & Sikkink, 2000; McMahon, 2009). 
Most importantly, Chile’s transition was instigated by the military regime’s loss in the 
democratic, national plebiscite. The NO victory symbolized the desire for democratic reforms, as 
well as secured democratic change by ushering in new elections, which granted the left 
governmental control. While Chileans feared that the military would refuse to accept the 
plebiscite’s results, peace was stressed by both sides of the political spectrum (International 
Commission, 1989). The regime recognized that using military might to reassert control would 
be perceived as illegitimate by the international and domestic community (International 
Commission, 1989). 
 Spain’s and Chile’s democratic transitions resulted in varying power dynamics. Spain’s 
democratic transition was a transition through transaction. The right continued governmental 
authority and negotiated from a position of power compared to the left. Chile’s democratic 
transition was a mix between a transition through transaction and a transition through extrication 
because the right maintained bargaining power and residual authority from right-leaning bias in 
the Constitution, but the left obtained governmental control. The opposing political perspectives 
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needed to negotiate in both countries, but the differing power dynamics between the right and 
left affected the pursuance of transitional justice.  
In Spain, the continuation of conservative control allowed the right to avoid 
responsibility for human rights abuses perpetrated throughout the Civil War. While both sides 
agreed to the Pacto de olvido and 1977 Amnesty Law to maintain democratic stability and foster 
political negotiations, the pact and law were more beneficial to the right since they engaged in 
greater human rights abuses. While the left was responsible for human rights violations during 
the Civil War, the left committed less crimes than the right and there were significantly more 
liberal victims (Greenspan, 2016). The left was negotiating to obtain reacceptance into society, 
while the right could focus on more complex goals because conservatives were automatically 
granted basic freedoms upon the advent of democracy. Transitional justice would have required 
conservatives to take responsibility for their crimes, which was not in their best interest. 
Conservatives used their authority to inhibit transitional justice by refusing to acknowledge 
crimes and recognize victims.  
In Chile, the transition of governmental power to the left allowed liberals to take 
increased steps towards transitional justice, but transitional justice was still limited due to the 
residual power of the right. Right-leaning constitutional bias prevented the left from obtaining a 
majority in Congress, which signified that the differing political ideologies needed to negotiate to 
pass legislation (Hudson, 1994). Additionally, the left did not want to provoke the military, 
which remained strong under Pinochet’s conservative control (Hudson, 1994). Despite, 
limitations imposed by the right, President Aylwin’s leftist government strove to take steps 
towards transitional justice to appease its liberal base. President Aylwin’s authority allowed the 
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left to establish a truth commission, which was a major step towards transitional justice because 
the commission acknowledged crimes, as well as sought the recognition and redress of victims.  
Chile’s democratic transition resulted in increased transitional justice compared to Spain, 
but both countries were limited due to amnesty laws and fear of instability. Fear existed in Spain 
and Chile, but Spain faced increased fear because of greater historical uncertainty, the attempted 
coup d’état, and ETA terrorism. Transitional justice was actively repressed in Spain. In Chile, 
fear and limitations on transitional justice existed, but a basis of transitional justice still endured.  
Fear served as a major inhibitor of transitional justice in Spain. During the initial 
transitional phase, Spain lacked a stable historical precedent with democracy and the path to 
democracy was unclear, which left many Spaniards wary of the feasibility of democracy 
(Encarnación, 2008). The Pacto de olvido and 1977 Amnesty also prevented discussion of all 
sensitive matters from the Civil War and dictatorship. The aim was to “forget” the past and 
create a stable democracy in which the political sides could coexist and negotiate without 
opening “old wounds” that could reinitiate conflict (Encarnación, 2008). The Pacto de olvido 
and 1977 Amnesty Law inhibited the primary aims of transitional justice since they prevented 
the acknowledgement of crimes and recognition and redress of victims. ETA terrorism and the 
attempted coup d’état by General Tejero augmented fear of instability because these 
unpredictable instances of violence demonstrated the fragility of the new democracy and the lack 
of stability (Ceberio Belaza, 2018). Maintaining peace and fostering democratic success was 
more important than transitional justice. Uncertainty of democratic success and safety inhibited 
transitional justice efforts until the 2000’s. The democratic stability of the 2000’s permitted 
Spaniards to feel confident in their ability to address their past of human rights abuses without 
fear of destabilizing the country.  
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While fear limited the extent of transitional justice, leftist Chilean politicians pursued the 
primary aims of transitional justice within the constraints that the government faced. Chile’s 
truth commission was a major step towards transitional justice, but the commission was limited 
due to its restricted mandate. Not all victims of the dictatorship were recognized or received 
reparations (Collins, 2017). Additionally, efforts to implement recommendations from the truth 
commission were halted after far-left violence against conservatives provoked fear of instability 
(Fletcher, 2014). Amnesty laws created while the dictatorship was in power prevented the 
prosecution of human rights abusers, and the residual power of the military made provoking the 
armed forces unappealing because new leaders did not want to risk a violent rebuke (Chilean 
National Commission, 1993). Fear combined with the need to negotiate with conservatives 
prevented leftist Chileans from instituting all of their transitional justice goals, but the transition 
still allowed them to achieve a greater extent of transitional justice due to their confidence in 
democratic success and the transition of power to the left.  
 
III. Implications of findings:  
 This thesis determined that Chile’s democratic transition achieved a greater extent of 
transitional justice compared to Spain’s transition by analyzing how specific aspects of each 
transition affected transitional justice. The analysis in this thesis thus demonstrates how specific 
factors of a transition can impede or support transitional justice. Fear, instability, uncertainty, 
and amnesty laws have immense power to prevent transitional justice. Political power dynamics 
during and after a democratic transition influence the ability of a government to pursue 
transitional justice. If conservatives maintain most of the power then transitional justice is 
restricted, but if the left attains power then there are greater opportunities for transitional justice. 
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When no single political ideology obtains the majority of power, the need to negotiate frequently 
limits transitional justice because concessions must be made by both sides. Strong democratic 
legacies, desire for democracy and human rights, international pressure for human rights-based 
policies, and truth commissions increase the likelihood of obtaining greater transitional justice.  
 While Chile achieved increased transitional justice compared to Spain, both countries 
faced limitations that inhibited transitional justice. This correlates with the current literature on 
the subject that suggests that modern day Spain and Chile must continue pursuing transitional 
justice (Collins, 2017; Escudero, 2014; Marengo, 2015; “Proposal for Spain,” 2018). Neither 
Spain nor Chile fully obtained transitional justice during or after their democratic transitions, 
thus scholars, the press, citizens, NGOs, and IGOs still advocate for Spain and Chile to 
continually pursue transitional justice. Understanding why Spain and Chile transitioned as they 
did, as well as how the transitions affected transitional justice helps give context to Spain’s and 
Chile’s current management of their histories of human rights abuses.  
Spain acknowledged crimes and recognized victims for the first time in 2007 with the 
passage of the Historical Memory Law. The law was created and passed by the Spanish Socialist 
Worker’s Party under Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, but harsh opposition from 
the Popular Party weakened the law before ratification, which left human rights activists and 
victims unsatisfied (Hancox, 2016). While leftists want open discussion of the Civil War and 
dictatorship, rightists repeatedly shut down or weaken efforts by arguing that opening old 
wounds will harm society and that the past should stay in the past (Hancox, 2016). The 
international community has pushed Spain to acknowledge its past and treat victims better, but 
because Spain suppressed transitional justice for decades, Spain has not come to terms with its 
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history and is now struggling to balance between rising advocacy for justice and residual efforts 
to “forget.”  
Efforts to hold Chilean human rights abusers accountable began when Pinochet was 
arrested in London in 1998. Spain requested Pinochet’s extradition, but he was ultimately 
released back to Chile where he was stripped of his parliamentary immunity, questioned, 
indicted for his crimes, and placed under house arrest (Jordan, 2007). Pinochet died before being 
convicted of any crimes, which left victims frustrated over the lack of justice (Jordan, 2007). 
Some members of Pinochet’s military regime have been prosecuted for their crimes, but getting 
around amnesty laws is difficult for judges (Slattery, 2015). While increased prosecutions and 
the establishment of a second truth commission in 2003 helped Chile pursue increased 
transitional justice, the country still faces international critique for permitting numerous human 
rights abusers to live freely without accountability (Marengo, 2015). Chilean politicians have 
been unsuccessful in passing legislation to nullify amnesty laws. The residual institutional 
rigidity and greater Congressional representation of the right over the left continues to limit the 
ability of politicians to overturn durable amnesty laws (Siavelis, 2016).  
 
IV. Points of future interest:  
Examining how rising scholarship and attention to the field of transitional justice has 
affected the development of transitional justice in Spain and Chile could give insight into the 
increasing value placed upon transitional justice in both countries. Transitional justice as a field 
of study, as well as a way to move out of conflict and authoritarianism, gained prominence 
during the late twentieth century and is continually expanding. Analyzing how the growth of 
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transitional justice aligned with the processes of transitional justice in Spain and Chile through 
the modern day may be insightful.  
In order to develop a holistic perspective of the extent of transitional justice achieved in 
post-dictatorship Spain and Chile, scholars should examine changes in transitional justice that 
occurred after the democratic transition. Decades have passed since Spain and Chile transitioned 
to democracy, and varying governmental administrations have taken steps towards and away 
from transitional justice. Both countries continued instituting democratic reforms and have 
established stable democracies. Evolving policies and levels of advocacy have altered the 
transitional justice landscape. Advocacy for transitional justice by leftists has continued to 
increase in Spain and Chile. Liberal citizens feel increasingly confident to voice their opinions 
without destabilizing the country or risking personal harm. Studying how actions taken after the 
democratic transition influenced the extent of transitional justice in a post-dictatorship society 
will continue to give scholars a greater understanding of Spain’s and Chile’s current 
management of their histories of human rights abuses.  
 The effect of the Spanish and Chilean democratic transitions on the extent of transitional 
justice achieved in post-dictatorship society can be further compared to additional countries 
transitioning out of authoritarian governments. Chile’s case study can be compared to Latin 
American countries that underwent democratic transitions to understand the effect of democratic 
transitions on transitional justice within the same regional and time context. While many former-
authoritarian European countries transitioned to democracy after the Allied victory in World War 
II or following the fall of the Soviet Union, Spain’s case study can be compared in a European 
context to enhance understanding of the processes of democratization and transitional justice in 
Europe. The extent of transitional justice achieved from the Spanish and Chilean democratic 
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transitions can be compared to the democratic transitions of Asian and African countries to 
further understand the extent of transitional justice achieved from democratic transitions in a 
cross-cultural context.  
 
V. Conclusion: 
Spain and Chile suffered through repressive dictatorships under Francisco Franco and 
Augusto Pinochet. These abusive regimes utilized human rights abuses to maintain control and 
achieve their political, societal, and economic goals. In the late twentieth century, the fall of the 
dictatorships paved the way for democratic transitions and steps towards transitional justice.  
This thesis asked the question, how did the Spanish and Chilean democratic transitions influence 
the extent of transitional justice achieved in post-dictatorship society? This study contextualized 
the relevant political, social, cultural, and economic environments of the transitions to study how 
historical contexts, types of democratic transitions and resulting power dynamics, fear, amnesty 
laws, and truth commissions affected the manifestation of transitional justice. Evidence suggests 
that Chile achieved a higher degree of transitional justice compared to Spain due to its strong 
history with democracy, international pressure for better human rights, President Aylwin’s 
liberal government, and the establishment of the truth commission. In Spain, transitional justice 
was limited because of Prime Minister Suárez’s conservative government, the Pacto de olvido 
and 1977 Amnesty Law, and high levels of fear from democratic uncertainty, ETA terrorism, and 
General Tejero’s attempted coup d’état. Spain and Chile both faced limitations on transitional 
justice due to the need for political negotiations, fear of destabilization, and amnesty laws. This 
research contributes to the understanding of why Spain and Chile currently manage their 
histories of human rights violations as they do.  
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Transitional justice should be a goal of post-authoritarian societies because it helps 
countries properly manage their histories of human rights violations. Tailored transitional justice 
measures can account for the needs, desires, and limitations present in transitioning or 
transitioned countries that are balancing growing democracies and human rights policies. 
Transitional justice is difficult to achieve and implementation strategies are never perfect, but 
striving for transitional justice is important for countries that seek internal reconciliation.    
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